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Two Essays on Multiple Directorships 
 
Chia-wei Chen 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation includes two related chapters that investigate the value of 
multiple directorships. In the first chapter, I focus on potential tradeoffs between the costs 
and benefits of multiple directorships held by outside directors and attempt to determine 
how firm characteristics affect such tradeoffs. It is widely believed that outside directors 
of a firm play important functions of monitoring and advising. As a result, the basic 
hypothesis of the first essay is that multiple directorships by outside directors can have 
different implications for firms that have different levels of monitoring and advising 
needs. Consistent with this hypothesis, the evidence suggests that firm performance is 
positively associated with multiple directorships for firms with high growth opportunities 
and low agency conflicts. Such firms would benefit more from better advising while not 
suffering much from less monitoring. Likewise, firm performance is negatively 
associated with multiple directorships for firms with low growth opportunities and high 
agency conflicts. In the second essay, I examine how multiple directorships held by 
outside directors affect shareholder wealth during acquisitions. The evidence indicates 
that not all busy outside directors have the same effect and some types of busy outside 
directors may benefit the firms.  
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Essay 1 
Growth Opportunities, Agency Conflicts, and 
the Effectiveness of Busy Outside Directors 
1. Introduction 
Do outside directors with multiple directorships add value to the board? Evidence 
has been mixed thus far. While Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find no 
evidence that such directors harm firm value, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Jiraporn, 
Kim, and Davidson (2007) suggest that multiple directorships result in ineffective 
monitoring and therefore reduce shareholder wealth. In contrast, Harris and Shimizu 
(2004) find that outside directors with multiple directorships are important sources of 
knowledge during acquisitions. In this essay, we attempt to provide a possible 
explanation for these conflicting findings and demonstrate empirically the conditions 
under which the costs and benefits of multiple directorships are most pronounced. Our 
results help to reconcile the conflicting findings in the extant literature and help to shed 
additional light on the on-going debate about multiple directorships.  
In the literature, two competing hypotheses—reputation hypothesis and busyness 
hypothesis—have been proposed concerning the effect of multiple directorships on firm 
value [see Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003)]. The Reputation hypothesis argues 
that directorships on the boards of other firms represent a reward from the labor market to 
a valuable director [Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983)]. As such, multiple 
directorships signal a director’s superior talent in serving the firms. Consistent with the 
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reputation hypothesis, Gilson (1990) finds that directors who resigned from financially 
distressed firms tend to hold fewer seats on other boards following their departure. 
Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) report that the likelihood of a retired CEO serving as 
an outside director on other boards is positively related to his/her performance while 
being the CEO, and Coles and Hoi (2003) find that directors who rejected anti-takeover 
provisions are more likely to obtain additional outside directorships.  
The busyness hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that simultaneously serving on 
multiple boards over-commits an individual to functions of those boards [Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992)]. Consequently, such individuals are likely to have less time to attend to 
functions of a given board and may therefore have to shirk their director responsibilities. 
Consistent with this view, Beasley (1996) finds that the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud is positively related to the number of directorships held by outside directors. Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) document that boards dominated by busy outside 
directors are associated with excessively high levels of CEO compensation and poor firm 
performance.  Fich and Shivdasani (2006) report a negative association between busy 
outside directors and firm performance. 
If outside directors play dual roles of monitors and advisors for the firm [see, for 
example, Fama and Jensen (1983)], it seems likely that multiple directorships would have 
different implications for those two roles. Indeed, it makes sense to suggest that outside 
directors with multiple directorships—i.e., busy outside directors—may be better at 
advising the firms whose boards they seat because of their perceived talent and 
experience, but busy outside directors may also be less effective at monitoring firm 
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management because of the time constraint imposed by their busyness. 1  More 
specifically, the value of outside directorships lies not just in the signal they provide 
about the director’s quality, but they also enable the director to enrich his or her  
experience as well as additional business contacts that would in turn be valuable for firm 
management teams and help to improve firm performance. Of course, multiple 
directorships also reduce the precious time available for the directors to provide effective 
monitoring on management decisions and, thus, may have a negative impact on firm 
performance. Therefore, whether or not multiple directorships by outside directors 
enhance or diminish the roles of a corporate board depends on the relative importance of 
advising or monitoring by outside directors. Furthermore, this trade-off has interesting 
implications for the relationship between busy outside directors and firm performance.2 
In this context, although some existing evidence suggests a negative relationship between 
multiple directorships and firm performance, more studies are needed to delineate 
between the potential costs and benefits of multiple directorships for different firms. 
In this essay, we provide empirical evidence to demonstrate that the costs and 
benefits of multiple directorships are sensitive to firm growth opportunities and 
managerial agency conflicts. The level of firm growth opportunities and managerial 
agency conflicts has interesting implications for multiple directorships because it affects 
                                                 
1 Previous literature attributed three functions to the board of directors: the control role, the strategic 
decision role [see, for example, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990)], and the resource acquirer role [see, for 
example, Boyd (1990)]. The last two functions require the experience, knowledge, or expertise of directors 
and are less likely to create a conflict of interest with the managers. We refer to these two functions as the 
advisory role. Detailed review for the board of directors could be found in Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand 
(1996), for example.  
2  Throughout this essay, a busy outside director is regarded as an outside director with multiple 
directorships or at least three directorships. 
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the relative importance of advising vis-à-vis monitoring functions of firm boards, 
particularly by their outside directors. For firms with relatively high growth opportunities 
and low managerial agency conflicts, the advising role of outside directors is likely to be 
more prominent than their monitoring role. Therefore, all else the same, high growth (and 
more rapidly changing) firms are likely to benefit more from the superior advice provided 
by outside directors with multiple directorships, who can bring to these firms their 
considerable knowledge and talent, as evidenced by their reputation in the directorship 
market. Busy outside directors are also likely to be less damaging to firms with low 
managerial agency conflicts because such firms do not require as much monitoring of 
management by outside directors. On the other hand, for firms with low growth 
opportunities and high managerial agency conflicts, the monitoring role of outside 
directors is relatively more important while their advising role is less so. Thus, for these 
types of firms, the downside associated with less effective monitoring by busy outside 
directors can lead to poorer firm performance as management pursues its own self 
interests at the expense of firm shareholders.   
With a sample of 3,428 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2003, our empirical 
results are supportive of the tradeoff contention. In particular, our analysis documents 
that outside directors with three or more directorships—“busy directors”—have a 
significant and positive effect on the performance of firms having low agency conflicts 
(less need for monitoring) and high growth opportunities (greater need for advising). 
However, such directors are detrimental to performance of firms that have high agency 
conflicts (high demand for monitoring) and low growth opportunities (low demand for 
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advising). Our findings remain qualitatively unchanged when a two-stage analysis is 
employed to control for the potential endogeneity problem or when alternative measures 
of firm performance, busy outside directors, growth opportunities, and agency conflicts 
are applied. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes our 
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the sample and the measures of key 
variables used in our analyses. Section 4 presents our empirical findings as well as 
additional robustness tests. Section 5 concludes the essay. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development  
 Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that outside directors add value to a corporate 
board by performing two important functions: monitoring and advising management. As 
monitors, outside directors having no affiliation with the firm other than their directorship 
should protect shareholder interests and enhance their wealth. Consistent with the 
monitoring role of outside directors, Weisbach (1988) reports that the likelihood of a 
firm’s CEO being replaced after a period of poor firm performance is indeed sensitive to 
the proportion of outside directors on the firm’s board. Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma 
(2004) also report that the likelihood of corporate wrongdoing decreases when firm 
boards are dominated by outside directors.  
As advisors or providers of knowledge to management, outside directors can 
share their experience or business connections which can be helpful for the management 
team and can therefore increase the likelihood of firm success. Dalton, Daily, Johnson, 
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Ellstrand (1999) similarly indicate that outside directors provide constructive advice 
which may not be available from insiders because of different perspectives by outsiders. 
Supporting this view, Brook and Rao (1994) find evidence that outside directors are 
valuable to financial distress firms that adopt liability limitation provisions.  
In general, empirical evidence is mixed on the benefit of outside directors. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) document a positive stock price reaction surrounding the 
appointments of outside directors. However, Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (2001) find weak or no 
relationship between board independence—dominated by outside directors—and firm 
performance. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) actually find a negative association between 
the percentage of outside directors on the board and firm performance measured by 
Tobin’s q.  Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) also suggest additional value to having 
insiders on the boards of R&D-intensive firms, as insider directors are knowledgeable 
about firm-specific investment opportunities and challenges. 
More recently, research has shifted the focus to the number of directorships held 
by outside directors.3 Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), 
among others, argue that the effectiveness of monitoring by outside directors could be 
damaged if outside directors have too many other board appointments. Serving on 
                                                 
3 The inconclusive evidence on the relationship between firm performance and outside directors on the 
board could be the result of firm characteristics, such as firm performance [Gilson (1990)],firm size, 
degrees of agency conflicts, growth opportunities, [see, for example, Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja 
(2007), Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2005), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008)], and negotiation between outside 
directors and the CEO [Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Kieschnick and Moussawi (2004)]. In addition, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) suggest that politically experienced directors could be important on the 
boards of firms in which politics matters more. While there are many different aspects to the debate on the 
relationship between firm performance and outside directors on the board, we focus on the directorships 
held by outside directors. Directorships signal the value of a director and as a result could make directors 
different.  
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multiple boards reduces available time an outside director can concentrate on one firm 
and thereby undermines the effectiveness of the director’s inspection of the firm’s 
managerial decisions. On the other hand, Fama (1980) and Vafeas (1999) among others 
argue that multiple directorships by outside directors can have positive implications for 
the firm. Being appointed to multiple boards represents a high regard for the individuals 
in the labor market and likely signals superior quality of such directors. Mace (1986) 
suggests that serving in multiple boards provides the directors with access to different 
management skills and business networking contacts, which could enhance their 
knowledge and enable them to better their services at different boards. Therefore, outside 
directors with multiple directorships could obtain a greater diversity of experience and 
become valuable sources of knowledge for the firms. Moreover, since multiple 
directorships are positively associated with firm size [Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 
(2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006)], such directors could be more capable or skillful, 
given the size and complexity of firm management or firm operations they oversee.4  
The cost and benefit tradeoff involving multiple directorships complicate the 
analysis of busy outside directors. The value of advising is enriched by multiple 
directorships, but the role of monitoring is damaged. Thus, while Ferris, Jagannathan, and 
Pritchard (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that the likelihood for outside 
directors to obtain more board seats is increasing in the performance of the firms in 
which they serve on their boards, the costs of multiple directorships are also observed in 
corporate events such as financial statement fraud [Beasley (1996)], CEO turnover [Fich 
                                                 
4 Our sample also reports a significantly positive association between firm size and multiple directorships 
as shown on Table 1. 
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and Shivdasani (2006)], and acquisitions [Ahn, Jiraporn, and Kim (2008)]. Thus far, to 
our knowledge, there have been no studies that focus specifically on the cost and benefit 
tradeoff of multiple directorships. 5  In particular, it is unclear that under what 
circumstances multiple directorships would add value to the board and to firm 
performance. Under what circumstances would the value of advising by busy outside 
directors outweigh the cost of less effective monitoring? And under what circumstances 
would multiple directorships be beneficial? We address these questions. Answers to such 
questions would help to shed light on the conflicting evidence concerning the value of 
multiple directorships as well as to provide a better view for shareholders and/or 
regulators to address the importance of having an outsider-dominated corporate board.  
As we have made clear, we view outside directors as playing important dual roles 
of monitoring and advising to firm management. Failure to serve effectively as a monitor 
or an advisor compromises the function of the board and can harm firm performance. 
Therefore, the value of multiple directorships for a firm depends crucially on the relative 
importance of monitoring versus advising required of outside directors. If the need for 
monitoring is important for certain types of firms, outside directors with multiple 
directorships would be less able to provide the necessary level of oversight. In this case, 
we could expect a possibly negative relationship between multiple directorships and firm 
performance. In contrast, if the need for advising is relatively more important, multiple 
                                                 
5 Adams (2002) discusses the dual (advising and monitoring) roles of the board. In particular, he suggests 
the tradeoff between advising and monitoring depends on managerial ownerships and manager’s career 
concern. Adams (2003) examines board behavior and suggests that the board provides different functions 
(monitoring, dealing with strategic issues and considering the interests of stakeholders) in firms with 
different characteristics. While the advising and monitoring roles have been introduced, there is no study 
that looks at the linkage between multiple directorships and board functions. 
  9 
 
 
 
directorships could be beneficial by enriching the experience, knowledge, as well as 
business connections for outside directors. 6 In the latter case, the cost of ineffective 
monitoring could be offset and a positive relationship may exist between multiple 
directorships and firm performance.  
In summary, in light of the dual advising and monitoring roles of corporate boards, 
we propose the following hypotheses in which the value of multiple directorships may be 
positive, negative, or generally indeterminate, depending on firm types.   
 
I. In firms with relatively greater need for advising but less need for 
monitoring by outside directors, multiple directorships should add value 
to board functions and therefore should be positively associated with firm 
performance. 
 
II.A. In firms with greater need for both advising and monitoring, the 
relationship between firm performance and multiple directorships is 
generally ambiguous. 
 
                                                 
6 Multiple directorships reduce the time for directors to provide effective monitoring and therefore make 
busy outside directors costly. While additional appointments may also reduce the time for directors to 
provide valuable advising, Harris and Shimizu (2004) indicate that directorships represent sources of 
knowledge and find that shareholder wealth is associated with the number of directorships held by directors. 
In addition, our empirical evidence shows a positive association between the average directorships held by 
outside directors and firm performance, as shown in Table 3.   
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II.B. In firms with less need for both advising and monitoring, the 
relationship between firm performance and multiple directorships is 
generally also ambiguous.      
 
III. In firms with relatively less need for advising but greater need for 
monitoring, multiple directorships should hamper the effectiveness of 
board monitoring and therefore should be negatively associated with firm 
performance.          
 
3. The Sample and Variables 
A. The Sample Selection Process 
Included in our sample are S&P 500 firms and other publicly traded firms that 
have at least one billion dollars in total assets at the year end from 1998 to 2003. We 
restricted our sample only to such large firms because directors in these firms are likely 
to hold multiple directorships.7 For each observation, financial data must be available 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and from Compustat. 
Information about the board of directors must be available on the Edgar data retrieval 
system. Finally, utilities (SIC 4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are 
excluded in our sample because these firms are highly regulated. The criteria yield a final 
sample of 3,428 observations for 923 companies from 1998 to 2003.  
                                                 
7 This restriction allows us to compare our results with studies such as Fich and Shivdasani (2006) in which 
Fortune 500 firms are applied. Not included in the tables, we randomly select firms that are not S&P 500 
firms and have less than one billion dollars in total assets. The percentage of busy outside directors on 
average is about 12%. In addition, more than 50% of these relatively small firms do not have busy outside 
directors. 
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B. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
The goal of this essay is to estimate the value of multiple directorships by 
analyzing the relationship between firm performance and multiple directorships. 
However, several variables could be related to firm performance as well as multiple 
directorships and could affect our results about the value of multiple directorships. We 
group these variables into board characteristics and firm characteristics and provide 
detailed description about these variables in following sections. 
  
B.1 Board Characteristics  
To capture multiple directorships, we employ three measures: percentage of busy 
outside directors, average directorships held by outside directors, and busy board 
indicator. These measures could also be found in studies such as Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker (1999), Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003), Perry and Peyer (2005), and 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006). Outside directors are defined as busy if they serve on at least 
three corporate boards and a board is defined as busy if 50% or more of its outside 
directors are busy.  
In Table 1, descriptive statistics for characteristics of our sample firms indicates 
that the average (median) directorships held by an outside director is 2.23 (2.14), 
suggesting that grouping outside directors into busy or non-busy by three directorships 
separates our sample about equally into two sub-samples. For the percentage of busy 
outside directors, the average (median) is 34% (33%). The percentage of busy boards in 
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our sample firms is about 32%. These numbers are relatively small compared with data 
around the early 1990s [see, for example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006)]. In addition, the 
average for the percentage of busy outside directors decreases from about 37% in 1998 to 
about 32% in 2003. Similarly, the percentage of busy boards in our sample decreases 
from about 37% in 1998 to about 26% in 2003. The likelihood of appointing a busy 
  
Table 1 
Data Description 
 
Table 1 provides statistics for characteristics of our sample firms. The sample consists of 3,428 annual 
observations for 923 companies between 1998 and 2003. Companies are included in our sample if they are 
either S&P 500 firms or their total assets are at least $1 billion. Utility (4900-4949) and financial 
companies (6000-6999) are excluded in our sample. Outside directors are defined as busy if they hold at 
least 3 directorships. Busy board is a dummy variable. It is 1 if 50% or more than 50% of outside directors 
are busy and 0 otherwise. CEO busy outside directors are busy outside directors with a CEO title in another 
firm. Industry busy outside directors are busy outside directors with 50% or more than 50% of their 
directorships sharing the same 2-digit SIC code. CEO chairman is a dummy variable. It is 1 if CEO is the 
chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the stock inclusion in the 
CRSP database. Operating margin is operating income divided by total assets. Tobin’s q is calculated as 
market value of common equity plus preferred stock liquidating value, plus long term debt, minus short-
term assets, plus short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total assets. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median
 
 
5% 
 
 
95% 
Correlation 
with 
“busy board” 
Board Characteristics      
  Percentage of busy outside directors 0.34 0.33 0 0.78 0.81*** 
  Average directorships per outside director 2.23 2.14 1 3.67 0.72*** 
  Busy board (0, 1) 0.32 0 0 1  
  Percentage of CEO busy outside directors 0.09 0 0 0.33 0.43*** 
  Percentage of industry busy outside directors 0.02 0 0 0.20 0.16*** 
  Percentage of outside directors 0.64 0.67 0.29 0.90 0.09*** 
  Board size 9.90 10 6 14 0.14*** 
  Outside director ownership 0.01 0 0 0.04 -0.07*** 
  CEO chairman (0, 1) 0.70 1 0 1 0.09*** 
  CEO ownership 0.02 0 0 0.12 -0.04** 
  CEO in the nominating committee (0, 1) 0.11 0 0 1 -0.02 
  Percentage of outside directors in the  
          nominating committee 
0.60 
 
0.75 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0.12*** 
 
Firm Characteristics      
  Total assets ($ million) 8,418 2,817 1,062 28,464 0.14*** 
  Firm age 23.4 25 4 41 0.11*** 
  Operating margin 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.29 0.02 
  Governance index (Gompers et al. (2003)) 9.53 10 5 14 0.07*** 
  Tobin’s q 1.65 1.11 0.37 4.61 0.03* 
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outside director has decreased in recent years possibly in response to the push for 
stronger corporate governance [see, for example, NACD (1998)].  
Other than the measures of multiple directorships, we include several variables 
related to board structure. Fich (2005) find evidence from Fortune 1000 firms that CEOs 
are sought as outside directors to enhance firm value. We capture the percentage of busy 
outside directors with a CEO title. Holding directorships in the same industry indicates 
that directors are specialized in this given industry. However, these directors could also 
be less distracted by demand for multiple directorships [Ferris, Jagannathan, and 
Pritchard (2003)]. We also add a variable, the percentage of industry busy outside 
directors, to capture whether busy outside directors hold 50% or more of their 
directorships in the same industry classified by 2-digit SIC code. Yermack (1996) as well 
as Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) report a negative association between board 
size and firm value. We measure board size by the number of directors on the board. 
Management ownership signals the alignment of management and shareholder interests 
[Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)]. In addition, 
Weisbach (1988), Baker and Gompers (2000), and Lasfer (2006) report that managers 
with high ownership are more likely to choose a board that is unlikely to monitor. We 
measure the percentage of shares held by the CEO and outside directors. While 
inconclusive evidence has been found for the relationship between firm performance and 
CEO duality (chairman of the board and CEO are the same individual) [see, for examples, 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) and Daily and Dalton (1992)], CEO duality could potentially 
reduce the effectiveness of board monitoring. We use a dummy variable to capture the 
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CEO duality in our sample firms. Finally, the selection of a board member could be 
related to the nominating committee [Shivdasani and Yermack (1999)]. We include the 
percentage of outside directors in the nominating committee as well as a dummy variable 
to capture the CEO being in the nominating committee.  
Consistent with related studies, the mean and median of the variables described 
above indicate that the percentage of both CEO and industry-related busy outside 
directors are small. The Chairman of the board and the CEO are likely to be the same 
individual. Both CEO ownership and outside director ownership are equal to or less than 
2% on average. As shown in the last column of Table 1, we also capture the correlation 
between variables and a busy board. For board characteristics, a busy board is positively 
related to the percentage of CEO and industry-related busy outside directors, percentage 
of outside directors, board size, dual CEO, and percentage of outside directors in the 
nominating committee. In contrast, a busy board is negatively related to CEO ownership 
and outside director ownership. These results suggest busy outside directors are 
pronounced in a large board and a board dominated by outside directors. In addition, 
insider ownerships which potentially reduce agency conflicts may alter the proportion of 
busy outside directors. However, a positive relationship between the percentage of 
outside directors in the nominating committee and a busy board casts a doubt: if busy 
outside directors are associated with weak corporate governance as well as weak firm 
performance [Fich and Shivdasani (2006)], then it is unclear why an independent 
nominating committee would invite these directors to join the board.  
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B.2 Firm Characteristics 
Since we suspect that the relationship between multiple directorships and firm 
performance is sensitive to the need for advising and monitoring, we employ growth 
opportunities (measured by Tobin’s q) and managerial agency conflicts (measured by 
governance index) to proxy, respectively, the need for advising and monitoring. Tobin’s 
q, which is widely used to proxy a firm’s growth opportunities, is defined as market value 
of common equity plus preferred stock liquidating value, plus long term debt, minus 
short-term assets, plus short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total assets [Chung and 
Pruitt (1994)]. A higher Tobin’s q indicates higher growth opportunities, and vice versa. 
The governance index is constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); it measures 
the impact of 28 provisions related to shareholder protection on the balance of power 
between managers and shareholders. Although Jensen (1986) argues that the threat of 
takeover is a strong form of managerial discipline, a firm with higher governance index 
(i.e., more anti-takeover provisions) is expected to have a higher degree of managerial 
agency problem. 
To capture firm performance, we use the operating profit margin, which is 
calculated as the firm’s operating income standardized by total assets. In our robustness 
tests, additional measures, including sales scaled by total assets, earnings per share, and 
market to book ratio are applied to verify our findings. Finally, firm size and firm age 
have been found to be related to firm growth [Evans (1987)]. We measure firm size by 
total assets, in millions of dollars, and firm age by the number of years since the stock’s 
inclusion in the CRSP database.  
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Results in Table 1 indicate that all firm characteristics, except operating margin, 
are positively and significantly associated with a busy board. Consistent with related 
studies, larger and older firms are more likely to have a busy board. While the likelihood 
of a busy board is positively related to agency conflicts, it is also positively related to 
growth opportunities. The lack of a significant relationship between firm performance 
and a busy board may reflect the opposing effects associated with the costs and benefits 
of multiple directorships in the sample as a whole. In further analysis, we attempt to 
disentangle the costs and benefits by looking at certain types of firms in which the 
relative costs and benefits may be more pronounced. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
A. Univariate Tests 
Multiple directorships enrich the experience, knowledge, as well as business 
contacts of a director and could therefore be valuable sources of knowledge to managers. 
Alternatively, if managers are not focused on maximizing shareholder wealth, the need 
for monitoring becomes more important. Multiple directorships weaken the monitoring 
effectiveness of the board. Accordingly, the value (cost) of multiple directorships is more 
pronounced when the need for advising is more (less) pressing—when growth 
opportunities are high (low), and when the need for monitoring is less (more)—when 
managerial agency conflicts are low (high).  
In Table 2, we group firms by the sample medians of growth opportunities and 
managerial agency conflicts. High Tobin’s q and low governance index firms are likely to 
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have high demand for advising and low demand for monitoring, while low Tobin’s q and 
high governance index firms should have low demand for advising and high demand for 
monitoring. Within each group, we compare the operating margin for firms in which the 
average directorships held by outside directors is greater than 2 and for firms in which the 
average directorships held by outside directors is less than or equal to 2. In the group with 
high growth opportunities (high Tobin’s q) and low agency conflicts (low governance 
index), firms with average directorships held by outside directors greater than 2 have 
higher operating margin in either mean or median than firms with average directorships 
  
Table 2 
Growth Opportunities, Agency Conflicts, Multiple Directorships, and Firm 
Performance 
 
Table 2 provides the operating margin under each group constructed by Tobin’s q, governance index 
(Gompers et al. (2003)), and average directorships held by outside directors. High (low) Tobin’s q and 
governance index indicate that the Tobin’s q and governance index are above (below or equal to) the 
sample medians. The sample consists of 3,428 annual observations for 923 companies between 1998 and 
2003. Companies are included in our sample if they are either S&P 500 firms or their total assets are at 
least $1 billion. Utility (4900-4949) and financial companies (6000-6999) are excluded in our sample. 
Operating margin is operating income divided by total assets. Tobin’s q and governance index are applied 
to proxy growth opportunities and agency conflicts. Tobin’s q is calculated as market value of common 
equity plus preferred stock liquidating value, plus long term debt, minus short-term assets, plus short-term 
liabilities, and then scaled by total assets. ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  High Tobin’s q & 
low governance 
index 
Low Tobin’s q & 
high governance 
index 
Difference t/z statistics
Average directorships held by Mean 0.183 0.110 0.073*** 14.1 
      outside directors  >  2 Median 0.186 0.115 0.071*** 13.9 
 N 377 546   
      
Average directorships held by  Mean 0.166 0.120 0.046*** 7.9 
      outside directors <= 2 Median 0.172 0.121 0.051*** 9.2 
 N 463 412   
      
Difference Mean 0.017** -0.010***   
 Median 0.014** -0.006**   
 N 840 958   
t statistics 2.51 2.62   
z statistics  2.42 2.00   
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held by outside directors less than or equal to 2. This difference suggests that multiple 
directorships add value to firms when there is a strong need for advising but a weak need 
for monitoring. In contrast, in the group with low growth opportunities (low Tobin’s q) 
and high agency conflicts (high governance index), firms with average directorships held 
by outside directors greater than 2 have a significantly lower operating margin than firms 
with average directorships held by outside directors less than or equal to 2, suggesting 
that multiple directorships are costly to the firms that need more monitoring but less 
advising. 
The mean (median) difference between high growth/low agency problem firms 
and low growth/high agency problem firms is 0.073 (0.071) in firms with average 
directorships held by outside directors greater than 2 compared to 0.046 (0.051) in firms 
with directorships held by outside directors less than or equal to 2. This evidence 
potentially highlights the opposite roles of multiple directorships. A board dominated by 
outside directors with more than 2 directorships on average provides better advising but 
weak monitoring. In contrast, a board in which outside directors hold no more than 2 
directorships on average provides more effective monitoring but relatively poor advising.  
While these results support our hypotheses that the relationship between firm 
performance and multiple directorships is sensitive to the need for advising and for 
monitoring, the impact of advising seems comparable to the impact of ineffective 
monitoring on firm performance. More specifically, when the need for advising is strong 
(weak) and the need for monitoring is weak (strong), multiple directorships increase 
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(decrease) operating margin by 0.01 (0.007) on average and by 0.005 (0.005) based on 
medians.8  
 
B. Multivariate Tests 
Firm performance could be related to firm characteristics and other board 
characteristics. To address this issue, we apply multivariate analyses to control for the 
potential impact from such variables. In addition, the fixed-effect analysis is applied to 
prevent the potential problems arising from repeated observations of individual sample 
firms. In each regression, we include two interactive terms to capture the value and cost 
of multiple directorships. The first interaction term is the measure of multiple 
directorships times the (0, 1) indicator of high growth opportunities (high Tobin’s q) and 
low agency conflicts (low governance index). High (low) Tobin’s q or governance index 
is defined as above (below or equal to) the sample median of Tobin’s q or governance 
index. If the value of multiple directorships is mostly pronounced in firms with higher 
need for advising and lower need for monitoring, the coefficient of this interactive term 
should be significantly positive. The second interactive term is the measure of multiple 
directorships times the {0, 1} indicator of low growth opportunities (low Tobin’s q) and 
high agency conflicts (high governance index). If the cost of multiple directorships is 
more pronounced in firms with higher need for monitoring and lower need for advising, a 
significantly negative coefficient for this interactive term should be observed. The 
                                                 
8 The mean (median) of operating margin for firms with high grow/ low agency problem is 0.173 (0.181). 
The mean (median) of operating margin for firms with low grow/ high agency problem is 0.117 (0.119).     
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coefficient for the measure of multiple directorships therefore represents the value (or 
cost) of multiple directorships in firms with higher need for both monitoring and advising 
(or with lower need for both monitoring and advising). According to our hypotheses 
developed in section 2, this coefficient could be positive, negative, or generally 
indeterminate. 
In regressions (1) and (3) of Table 3, we test whether multiple directorships 
improve firm performance by including only the first interaction term introduced above. 
Multiple directorships are measured by the percentage of busy outside directors in 
regression (1) and the average directorships held by outside directors in regression (3). 
Consistent with our expectation, when Tobin’s q is high (i.e., high demand for advising) 
and governance index is low (i.e., low demand for monitoring), the operating margin for 
firms in which all outside directors are busy is about 0.025 higher than the operating 
margin for firms in which all outside directors are not busy. Similarly, in this case, the 
operating margin in firms in which outside directors hold 3 directorships on average is 
about 0.014 higher than the operating margin in firms in which outside directors hold 
only 1 directorship. The relatively small coefficients for the interactive terms in 
regression (3) could be the result of numerous directorships held by certain outside 
directors. In other words, while the average directorships held by outside directors is 3, it 
is not necessarily true that all outside directors are busy outside directors. However, the 
significant coefficient for the interactive term in regression (3) suggests individual 
directorships could have their own value. 
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Table 3 
Busy Outside Directors and Firm Performance 
 
Table 3 provides fixed effects regressions of operating margin and busy outside directors. The sample 
consists of 3,428 annual observations for 923 companies between 1998 and 2003. Companies are included 
in our sample if they are either S&P 500 firms or their total assets are at least $1 billion. Utility (4900-4949) 
and financial companies (6000-6999) are excluded in our sample. Dependent variable, operating margin, is 
calculated as operating income divided by total assets. Outside directors are defined as busy if they hold at 
least 3 directorships. CEO busy outside directors are busy outside directors with a CEO title in another firm. 
Industry busy outside directors are busy outside directors with 50% or more than 50% of their directorships 
sharing the same 2-digit SIC code. CEO chairman is a dummy variable. It is 1 if CEO is the chairman of 
the board and 0 otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the stock inclusion in the CRSP database. 
Tobin’s q and governance index (Gompers et al. (2003)) are applied to proxy growth opportunities and 
agency conflicts. Tobin’s q is calculated as market value of common equity plus preferred stock liquidating 
value, plus long term debt, minus short-term assets, plus short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total 
assets. High (low) Tobin’s q and governance index indicate the Tobin’s q and governance index are above 
(below or equal to) the sample medians. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -0.017** -0.007   
 (-2.16) (-0.90)   
Average directorships held by outside directors   0.0004 0.002 
   (0.15) (0.87) 
Percentage of busy outside directors x 0.025*** 0.021***   
        high Tobin’s q & low governance index (3.24) (2.68)   
Percentage of busy outside directors x  -0.028***   
        low Tobin’s q & high governance index   (-3.69)   
Average directorships held by outside directors   0.007*** 0.006*** 
        x high Tobin’s q & low governance index   (4.47) (4.29) 
Average directorships held by outside directors    -0.007*** 
        x low Tobin’s q & high governance index     (-4.89) 
Percentage of CEO busy outside directors 0.015 0.016 0.007 0.007 
 (1.40) (1.44) (0.65) (0.65) 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.012 
 (1.16) (0.97) (0.73) (0.69) 
Percentage of outside directors 0.025** 0.024** 0.023** 0.021** 
 (2.30) (2.23) (2.12) (1.97) 
Outside director ownership -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.011 
 (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.31) (-0.28) 
Log (board size) -0.015* -0.016* -0.015* -0.017** 
 (-1.75) (-1.84) (-1.82) (-1.99) 
CEO chairman (0, 1) -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-0.09) (-0.02) (-0.07) (0.01) 
CEO ownership -0.034 -0.033 -0.034 -0.032 
 (-1.01) (-0.99) (-1.02) (-0.97) 
Log (asset) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.45) (0.56) (0.39) (0.61) 
Log (firm age) -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
 (-0.46) (-0.32) (-0.57) (-0.43) 
Tobin’s q 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (12.4) (12.3) (12.3) (12.1) 
Governance index  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.58) (0.84) (0.96) (1.61) 
Year (0, 1) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 
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While we observe the value of multiple directorships from firms with higher need 
for advising and lower need for monitoring, the coefficient for the percentage of busy 
outside directors in regression (1) suggest that busy outside directors could reduce 
operating margin in other firms. To verify that the cost of multiple directorships could be 
mostly pronounced in firms with low Tobin’s q (less need for advising) and high 
governance index (more need for monitoring), we add a second interactive term in 
regression (2) and (4) to capture the cost of multiple directorships. Coefficients of the 
second interaction term indicate that if Tobin’s q is low and governance index is high, the 
operating margin is 0.028 lower in firms in which all outside directors are busy than in 
firms in which all outside directors are not busy. Similarly, if Tobin’s q is low and 
governance index is high, operating margin is about 0.014 lower in firms in which 
outside directors hold 3 directorships on average than in firms in which outside directors 
hold only 1 directorship. These findings are consistent with our argument that the value 
(cost) of multiple directorships is more pronounced in firms with higher (lower) need for 
advising and lower (higher) need for monitoring.9 In addition, in firms with either lower 
need for both advising and monitoring or higher need for both advising and monitoring, 
multiple directorships measured by the percentage of busy outside directors in regression 
(2) and the average directorships held by outside directors in regression (4) provide 
                                                 
9 In terms of advising, the number of busy outside directors could be more important than the percentage of 
such directors. Not reported in tables, we measure multiple directorships by the number of busy outside 
directors on the board. The coefficient for the number of busy outside directors in firms with low agency 
conflicts and high growth opportunities (high agency conflicts and low growth opportunities) is 0.03 (-0.03) 
and significant at 1% level. Accordingly, the value of advising as well as monitoring could be observed 
when different measures of multiple directorships are applied. 
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unclear effect in firm performance; either both advising and monitoring are ineffective or 
the value of advising is offset by the cost of less effective monitoring. 
Our results show that most of the control variables are insignificant, but the 
operating margin is negatively associated with board size and positively associated with 
the percentage of outside directors and Tobin’s q. The significant and positive 
coefficients of the percentage of outside directors suggest that the operating margin is 
about 0.023 higher in firms in which all directors are outside directors than in firms 
without outside directors. Combined with the value of multiple directorships, we could 
further conclude that the operating margin is 0.045 (i.e. 0.021+0.024) higher in firms in 
which all directors are busy outside directors and the need for advising (monitoring) is 
high (low) than in firms without outside director. The mean and median of operating 
margin in our sample are about 0.15 and 0.14, respectively, as reported on Table 1. An 
increase of 0.045 in operating margin is non-trivial economically. For the variables of 
ownerships, we do not find a positive relationship between these variables and operating 
margin, but the negative coefficients for these variables remain insignificant in all 
regressions. Finally, the coefficients for the governance index indicate a positive 
relationship between agency conflicts and firm performance. However, they are relatively 
small and remain insignificant in all regressions. 
 
C. Robustness Tests 
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To check the robustness of our results, we include different regression models as 
well as different measures of firm performance, multiple directorships, growth 
opportunities, and agency conflicts in our analysis. Results are reported in Table 4. 
We first apply a two-stage analysis as shown in regressions (1) and (2) in Panel A 
of Table 4. Multiple directorships could be the result of board characteristics as well as 
firm characteristics [see, for examples, Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2005), Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2008), Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007)]. Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999), in addition, report that the nature of appointments to the board could be 
influenced by the nominating committee. We use the percentage of outside directors in 
the nominating committee as well as a dummy variable, CEO in the nominating 
committee, to instrument the percentage of busy outside directors.10 CEO characteristics 
and firm characteristics are also included in the first stage tobit regression to predict the 
percentage of busy outside directors for the analysis in the second stage. While the 
coefficients in regression (1) indicate that the percentage of busy outside directors is 
associated with the percentage of outside directors in the nominating committee as well 
as with several variables related to board and firm characteristics, our findings in Table 3 
still hold in regression (2) of Table 4. The coefficients for the two interactive terms retain 
the same signs and significance at the 5% level. In addition, the value of busy outside 
directors is even stronger in firms with higher need for advising and lower need for 
monitoring than reported in regression (2) in Table 3.  
                                                 
10  The correlation between the percentage of outside directors in the nominating committee and the 
percentage of busy outside directors is 0.24 and significant at 1% level. The correlation between the 
percentage of outside directors in the nominating committee and the error term in the explanatory equation 
is 0.002 and insignificant. 
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In regression (3) as shown in Panel A of Table 4, we report OLS regression 
results for sample firms in the first year, 1998. Similar coefficients for the interactive 
terms are obtained. In regression (4), we replace the percentage of busy outside directors 
with a busy board indicator {0, 1}. Supporting our findings, the coefficients for the 
interactive terms in regression (4) indicate that if the board is dominated by busy outside 
directors, the operating margin increases by 0.01 in firms with higher (lower) need for 
advising (monitoring). In contrast, if the board is dominated by busy outside directors, the 
  
Table 4 
Busy Outside Directors and Firm Performance – Robustness Tests 
 
Table 4 provides regression results of firm performance and busy outside directors with two-stage analysis 
and alternative measures of busy outside directors, firm performance, and agency conflicts. In Panel A, 
regression (1) and (2) represent two-stage analysis of firm performance and busy outside directors. 
Dependent variable in regression (1) is the percentage of busy outside directors. Regression (3) only 
includes observations in the first year, 1998. In regression (4) the percentage of busy outside directors is 
replaced by a dummy indicator, busyboard. It is 1 if 50% or more than 50% of outside directors are busy 
and 0 otherwise. Firm performance in regression (2), (3) and (4) of Panel A is measured by operating 
margin. Operating margin is calculated as operating income divided by total assets. In Panel B, firm 
performance is measured by sales over assets in regression (1), earnings per share in regression (2), and 
market to book ratio in regression (3), and operating margin in regression (4). In regression (3), Tobin’s q is 
replaced by R&D expenses scaled by total assets. In regression (4), the governance index (Gompers et al. 
(2003)) is replaced by Herfindahl. The sample consists of 3,428 annual observations for 923 companies 
between 1998 and 2003. Companies are included in our sample if they are either S&P 500 firms or their 
total assets are at least $1 billion. Utility (4900-4949) and financial companies (6000-6999) are excluded in 
our sample. Outside directors are defined busy if they hold at least 3 directorships. CEO busy outside 
directors are busy outside directors with a CEO title in another firm. Industry busy outside directors are 
busy outside directors with 50% or more than 50% of their directorships sharing the same 2-digit SIC code. 
CEO chairman is a dummy variable. It is 1 if CEO is the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Firm age 
is the number of years since the stock inclusion in the CRSP database. Tobin’s q and R&D expenses scaled 
by total assets are applied to proxy growth opportunities. Tobin’s q is calculated as market value of 
common equity plus preferred stock liquidating value, plus long term debt, minus short-term assets, plus 
short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total assets. Governance index and Herfindahl index are applied to 
proxy agency conflicts. Herfindahl index is calculated by summing the squares of total sales of each firm 
sharing the same 2-digit SIC code divided by the square of total sales in the industry. High (low) Tobin’s q, 
governance index, Herfindahl index, and analyst coverage indicate the Tobin’s q, R&D scaled by total 
assets, governance index, and Herfindahl index are above (below or equal to) the sample medians. The t-
statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level,respectively. 
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Table 4 – Continue  
 
Panel A: Two-stage analysis, first-year regression, and alternative measure of busy outside directors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of outside directors in the nominating 0.027**    
        committee (2.21)    
CEO in the nominating committee (0, 1) -0.008    
 (-0.68)    
Percentage of busy outside directors  -0.223 0.020  
  (-1.56) (1.48)  
Busyboard indicator (0, 1)    -0.003 
    (-1.01) 
Percentage of busy outside directors x  0.046*** 0.029**  
        high Tobin’s q & low governance index  (4.19) (2.01)  
Percentage of busy outside directors x  -0.025** -0.028**  
        low Tobin’s q & high governance index   (-2.45) (-2.08)  
Busyboard indicator (0, 1) x    0.010* 
        high Tobin’s q & low governance index    (1.92) 
Busyboard indicator (0, 1) x    -0.012***
        low Tobin’s q & high governance index     (-2.62) 
Percentage of CEO busy outside directors  0.008 0.028 0.019* 
  (0.81) (1.27) (1.93) 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors  0.015 -0.022 0.024 
  (0.89) (-0.64) (1.43) 
Percentage of outside directors 0.140*** 0.058** 0.024 0.032***
 (4.58) (2.30) (1.60) (3.09) 
Outside director ownership -0.102 -0.036 -0.018 -0.030 
 (-0.93) (-0.84) (-0.23) (-0.78) 
Log (board size) 0.010 -0.013 0.025** -0.010 
 (0.45) (-1.50) (2.16) (-1.19) 
CEO chairman (0, 1) 0.006 0.001 0.015*** 0.000 
 (0.75) (0.40) (2.64) (-0.11) 
CEO ownership -0.083 -0.053 -0.012 -0.025 
 (-0.93) (-1.48) (-0.23) (-0.79) 
Log (asset) 0.069*** 0.016 -0.022*** -0.001 
 (10.6) (1.46) (-7.44) (-0.25) 
Log (firm age) -0.007 -0.006 0.001 -0.004 
 (-0.72) (-0.54) (0.21) (-0.41) 
Tobin’s q -0.002 0.006*** 0.031*** 0.006***
 (-1.12) (10.3) (16.5) (10.9) 
Governance index 0.005** 0.003* 0.001 0.0002 
 (1.96) (1.79) (0.70) (0.15) 
Year (0, 1) indicators Yes Yes No Yes 
Chi²   262    
R²    0.22 0.53 0.20 
 
operating margin decreases by 0.012 in firms with lower (higher) need for advising 
(monitoring). 
In Panel B of Table 4, we replace the measure of firm performance by sales scaled 
by total assets, earnings per share, and market to book ratio in regression (1), (2), and (3), 
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Table 4 – Continue  
 
Panel B: Alternative measures of firm performance, growth opportunities, and agency conflicts 
Dependent variable Sales/Assets EPS MB OPM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of busy outside directors 0.008 -0.198 0.020 -0.007 
 (0.26) (-0.69) (0.17) (-0.84) 
Percentage of busy outside directors x 0.082*** 0.594**   
        high Tobin’s q & low governance index (2.84) (2.19)   
Percentage of busy outside directors x -0.104*** -0.722***   
        low Tobin’s q & high governance index  (-3.68) (-2.66)   
Percentage of busy outside directors x   0.347* 
        high R&D/asset & low governance index   (1.68)  
Percentage of busy outside directors x   -0.149* 
        low R&D/asset & high governance index    (-1.71)  
Percentage of busy outside directors x    0.028***
        high Tobin’s q & low Herfindahl index    (3.30) 
Percentage of busy outside directors x    -0.028***
        low Tobin’s q & high Herfindahl index     (-3.13) 
Percentage of CEO busy outside directors 0.094** 0.919** 0.274* 0.005 
 (2.34) (2.38) (1.66) (0.41) 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors -0.121* -0.171 0.093 -0.009 
 (-1.88) (-0.28) (0.29) (-0.45) 
Percentage of outside directors 0.061 1.411*** 0.227 0.032***
 (1.50) (3.64) (1.20) (2.66) 
Outside director ownership 0.100 0.439 -0.531 -0.015 
 (0.65) (0.31) (-1.09) (-0.33) 
Log (board size) 0.021 -0.556* 0.189 -0.004 
 (0.66) (-1.85) (1.51) (-0.45) 
CEO chairman (0, 1) -0.004 -0.100 -0.016 -0.001 
 (-0.41) (-1.03) (-0.41) (-0.27) 
CEO ownership 0.257** -1.746 0.407 -0.035 
 (2.07) (-1.47) (0.70) (-0.95) 
Log (asset) -0.156*** 0.510*** -0.528*** -0.006 
 (-9.79) (3.42) (-5.42) (-1.19) 
Log (firm age) 0.078** -0.028 -0.362** -0.008 
 (2.03) (-0.08) (-2.43) (-0.73) 
Tobin’s q 0.013*** 0.065***  0.008***
 (6.67) (3.54)  (13.4) 
R&D/asset   2.949***  
   (2.86)  
Governance index 0.004 0.085 -0.003  
 (0.71) (1.61) (-0.13)  
Herfindahl index    0.048 
    (0.68) 
Year (0, 1) indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.21 0.07 0.17 0.22 
 
 respectively. The earnings per share is before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations. The market to book ratio is the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of 
the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book 
value of firm’s equity at the end of the year, scaled by the firm’s total asset at the end of 
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the year. Tobin’s q may proxy for things other than growth opportunities [Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)]. Therefore, we also replace Tobin’s q by R&D expenses 
scaled by total assets in regression (3). While the sizes of coefficients for the interactive 
terms are different, these coefficients remain significant and are qualitatively consistent 
with our earlier findings in Table 3.  
In regression (4) in Panel B of Table 4, we replace the governance index by the 
Herfindahl index which is sometimes used to proxy for the degree of potential managerial 
agency problems.11 Consistent with our earlier results, multiple directorships measured 
by the percentage of busy outside directors enhance (reduce) operating margin in firms 
with higher (lower) need for advising and lower (higher) need for monitoring (as proxied 
by the new measures). Though not reported in the tables, similar results are also obtained 
when we apply ROA and analyst coverage to proxy firm performance and agency 
conflicts.12 Instead of using the sample median to indicate high and low Tobin’s q or 
governance index, we separate high and low Tobin’s q by 1 [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 
(1989)], and high and low governance index by 9 [Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2003)]. The 
results, once again, are similar. Finally, board characteristics could be the result of firm 
performance [Gilson (1990)]. We apply the 1-year lagged values of all independent 
variables into our analysis. The coefficients (not reported in the tables) for both 
                                                 
11 Hart (1983) indicates the competition in the product market reduces the amount of managerial slack. 
Jagannathan and Srinivasan (1999) empirically test the relation between product market competition and 
corporate agency costs and report supporting evidence. Similarly we employ Herfindahl index, also known 
as Herfindahl-Hirschman index, to proxy the competition in the product market. Herfindalh index is 
calculated by summing the squares of total sales of each firm sharing the same 2-digit SIC code divided by 
the square of total sales in the industry. 
12 Financial analysts, as an information intermediary, play the role of information production and a solution 
to the agency problem (see e.g., Healy and Palepu (2001)). Accordingly, a firm with low analyst coverage 
is expected to have high degree of agency problem. 
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interactive terms are similarly 0.029 and -0.033, respectively, and remain significant at 
the 1% level.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
While previous empirical studies have highlighted the potential costs of multiple 
directorships [see, for examples, Beasley (1996), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), 
and Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson (2007)], the potential benefits of multiple directorships 
have not been carefully examined. We attempt to fill this void in this essay.  
With a sample of 3,428 firm-year observations of 923 large U.S. public firms 
from 1998 to 2003, our empirical evidence supports our hypothesis that multiple 
directorships have both costs and benefits to the firm. Furthermore, we reexamine the 
relationship between multiple directorships and firm performance and we analyze how 
the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of multiple directorships affect this relationship. 
More specifically, we observe that in firms with high growth opportunities (likely having 
greater need for advising) and low agency conflicts (likely having less need for 
monitoring), multiple directorships can be sources of beneficial advising, which improves 
board functions and firm performance. In contrast, in firms with low growth opportunities 
(lower need for advising) and high agency conflicts (more need for monitoring), multiple 
directorships can undercut effective monitoring by outside directors and therefore can 
negatively affect firm performance.   
Although Ahn, Jiraporn, and Kim’s (2008) suggest that the number of 
directorships as a result of the director’s reputation is positively associated with 
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shareholder wealth, excess directorships have been shown to be costly. Our findings 
provide an additional explanation for the conflicting evidence in previous studies 
regarding the association between multiple directorships and firm performance. These 
directors could be sources of knowledge but could also be weak monitors. Not knowing 
what a firm needs from these directors could make these directors costly and could 
therefore make the board ineffective. Finally, our findings are in line with Ferris, 
Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) and cast a doubt for limiting the number of 
directorships held by outside directors. 
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Essay 2 
Outside Directorships and Acquirer Returns 
1. Introduction 
Outside directorships signal the reputation of a valuable director [Fama (1980) 
and Fama and Jensen (1983)]. Supporting this notion, researchers find evidence that the 
likelihood for outside directors to obtain addition board seats is related to the 
performance of the firm in which they serve on the board [see Ferris, Jagannathan, and 
Pritchard (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006)]. Similarly, Harris and Shimizu (2004) 
show that multiple directorships could be important sources of knowledge that help to 
improve shareholder value during acquisitions. However, other recent studies suggest that 
outside directors with multiple directorships, also known as busy outside directors, serve 
less actively on board functions and therefore may shirk their responsibilities to protect 
shareholder wealth. Consistent with this hypothesis, such directors, for example, are 
positively associated with the likelihood of financial fraud [Beasley (1996)] and with 
excessive CEO compensation [Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)], and negatively 
associated with firm performance [Fich and Shivdasani (2006)]. While the debate on the 
value of busy outside directors focuses on two competing hypotheses, the reputation and 
the busyness hypotheses [see Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003)], there is limited 
research examining the link between shareholder wealth and the characteristics of 
individual busy outside directors.  
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Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) suggest that politically experienced directors could 
be relatively important on the boards of firms in which politics matters more. Defond, 
Hann, and Hu (2005) report that financial expertise on audit committees improves 
corporate governance and enhances shareholder value. Fich (2005) finds that 
shareholders react positively to director appointments when the appointees are CEOs of 
other firms. Potentially, individual directors with different occupations, experience, or 
expertise, could have specialized knowledge and make different contributions to the 
firm. 13   Thus, the association between busy outside directors and shareholder value 
creation could depend on the characteristics of individual busy outside directors.  
In this study, we provide additional evidence on the value of busy outside 
directors by examining their influence on wealth gains in mergers and acquisitions.  With 
a sample of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004, we find busy outside directors are not all 
the same. Although busy outside directors in general are negatively associated with 
acquirer returns during the announcement of acquisitions, those with a CEO title in an 
S&P 500 firm and those with outside directorships in different industries do not have a 
similar negative association. In addition, our results indicate that multiple directorships 
do not reduce the value of outside directors who have a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm. 
Although we do not find that busy outside directors with directorship(s) in the target’s 
industry improve acquirer returns, our results suggest that multiple directorships in 
different industries and management experience in relatively large firms make busy 
outside directors valuable sources of knowledge. Our results, therefore, suggest that the 
                                                 
13  In contrast, Klein (1998) reports that firm performance is not sensitive to the outside director’s 
occupation. 
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different characteristics of individual busy directors can have different effects on firm 
value. These findings may help to explain the conflicting relationships between firm 
value and busy outside directors found in previous studies. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our 
research questions. Section 3 describes our sample selection process, data sources, 
variables, and the summary statistics of these variables. Empirical results and robustness 
tests are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this essay. 
 
2. Motivation 
Acquisitions are major investments that can potentially change the strategic 
direction of the firm and significantly affect the wealth of its shareholders. However, it 
has been argued in the literature that acquisition decisions could result from potential 
conflicts of interest between mangers and shareholders [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. 
Indeed, available empirical evidence suggests that managers may not always make 
acquisitions with the purpose of maximizing shareholder wealth. Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1990), for example, argue that managers may extract private benefits at the 
expense of firm shareholders. Malmendier and Tate (2003) report that corporate 
investment decisions may have been driven by CEO hubris or overconfidence. In this 
context, independent outside directors play an important role in monitoring 
management’s investment decisions, so as to mitigate managerial agency conflicts and 
protect shareholder interests [see, for examples, Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Cotter, 
Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997)].  
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Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that if labor markets are 
efficient, directors of well-performing firms are likely to be rewarded with additional 
directorships. Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
empirically test the relation between director’s additional outside appointment and the 
performance of the firm in which the director is on the board and find supporting 
evidence. Thus, outside directors with multiple directorships can be viewed as likely 
having superior talent in serving as a director and in enhancing board functions as well as 
shareholder value. With this in mind, several studies measure a director’s value by the 
number of directorships the director holds [see, for example, Shivdasani (1993) and 
Vafeas (1999)]. However, other studies, such as Beasley (1996), Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker (1999), and Fich and Shivdasani (2006), argue that multiple directorships could 
lower the effectiveness of monitoring since busy directors may not have the time to 
carefully scrutinize managerial activities.  Thus, busy directors may be associated with 
lower firm value. 
Thus far, the debate on the value of busy outside directors has mainly focused on 
the number of directorships they hold. Left unexplored is how the characteristics of busy 
outside directors may have different effects on firm performance. Indeed, there is no 
reason why the impact of busy outside directors who have different occupational or job 
experiences should necessarily be the same. For instance, industry directors, those who 
have a majority of their directorships in the same industry and therefore potentially 
specialize in the industry [Ferris, Jagannathan, Pritchard (2003)] could be quite different 
from those who serve in boards of different industry firms. If outside directorships 
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provide directors with valuable knowledge and information on different management 
skills and business network contacts [see, for examples, Mace (1986), Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1994), Booth and Deli (1996), Carpenter and Westphal (2001) and Loderer and 
Peyer (2002)], then outside directors with multiple directorships in different industries 
(we will call them non-industry busy outside directors) could obtain a greater diversity of 
experience and consequently could become more valuable sources of knowledge for the 
firm.  
Table 5 
Summary Statistics 
 
Table 5 reports summary statistics for each variable in Panel A and the distribution of busy outside 
directors in firm level and director level in Panel B. The percentage for firm level in Panel B represents the 
percentage of firms in our sample with specific busy outside directors and is calculated as N divided by 854 
(number of acquiring firms). For example, 68.7% for busy outside directors indicates 68.7% of our sample 
acquiring firms have at least 1 busy outside directors. The percentage for director level in Panel B 
represents the percentage of total outside directors in our sample with specific characteristic and  is 
calculated as N divided by 4,913 (number of outside directors). For example, 31.7% for busy outside 
directors indicates 31.7% of our sample outside directors are busy outside directors or have at least 3 
directorships. The sample consists of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004. CAR (-1, 1) and CAR (-2, 2) are 
equal-weighted three-day and five-day cumulative abnormal returns in percentage points calculated using 
the market model. Outside directors are defined as busy if they hold three or more directorships. Industry 
busy outside directors are busy outside directors with at least 50% of their directorships sharing the same 2-
digit SIC code. Non-industry busy outside directors are busy outside directors with all outside directorships 
in other industries classified by 2-digit SIC code. SP500-CEO (Non-SP500-CEO) busy outside directors 
are busy outside directors with a CEO title in a S&P 500 (non-S&P 500) firm. Non-SP500 busy outside 
directors are busy outside directors not current employees or directors of S&P 500 firms. Board size 
measures the number of directors. Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up is acquirer’s buy-and-
hold abnormal return during the period (-210, -11) with the CRSP value-weighted market index as the 
benchmark. Free cash flow is calculated as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, 
income taxes, and capital expenditures scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is the book value of 
long-term debts and short-term debts over market value of total assets. Tobin’s q is calculated as market 
value of common equity plus preferred stock liquidating value, plus long term debt, minus short-term assets, 
plus short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total assets. Relative deal size is deal value over acquirer’s 
market capitalization.  Market capitalization, measured in millions, is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the year end prior to announcement date. Diversifying 
acquisitions are acquisitions in which acquirers and targets do not share a 2-digit SIC code. Intrastate is a 
dummy indicator and is 1 if acquirer and target are in the same state. The t-statistics is reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 - Continue 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median 5% 95% 
Abnormal returns:     
CAR (-1, 1) -1.88 -1.01 -14.3 8.15 
CAR (-2, 2) -1.72 -1.20 -15.1 9.84 
Board characteristics:     
Percentage of outside directors               0.63 0.67 0.29 0.90 
Percentage of busy outside directors     0.33 0.33 0 0.80 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors 0.03 0 0 0.22 
Percentage of non-industry busy outside directors 0.10 0 0 0.38 
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors 0.06 0 0 0.30 
Percentage of non-SP500-CEO busy outside directors 0.02 0 0 0.17 
Percentage of non-SP500 busy outside directors 0.11 0 0 0.40 
Average directorships of outside directors 2.23 2.17 1 3.80 
Board size 9.90 10 6 15 
CEO chairman 0.70 1 0 1 
Inside ownership 0.06 0.01 0 0.24 
Acquirer characteristics:     
Acquirer’s market capitalization 26,114 5,473 415 146,135 
Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up 0.18 0.07 -0.43 1.07 
Free cash flow 0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.20 
Leverage 0.16 0.12 0 0.42 
Total assets  20,133 4,385 488 50,409 
Tobin’s q 2.14 1.39 0.40 6.02 
Deal characteristics:     
All-cash deal  0.29 0 0 1 
Diversifying acquisitions 0.40 0 0 1 
Intrastate  0.19 0 0 1 
Relative deal size 0.24 0.09 0 1.04 
Tender offer  0.24 0 0 1 
Panel B: Busy outside directors 
 Firm level Director level 
 N % N % 
Busy outside directors     587 68.7 1,556 31.7 
Industry busy outside directors 99 11.6 143 2.9 
Non-industry busy outside directors 338 39.6 561 11.4 
SP500-CEO busy outside directors 243 28.5 464 9.4 
Non-SP500 busy outside directors 394 46.1 497 10.1 
  
In our sample of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004, as shown on Panel B of 
Table 5, about 70 percent of acquirers have at least one busy outside director. More than 
10 percent of these acquirers have industry busy outside director(s) (i.e. at least 50% of 
directorships sharing the same 2-digit SIC code) and about 40 percent of these acquirers 
have non-industry busy outside director(s). Among our total sample of 4,913 outside 
directors, only about 3 percent of these directors have a majority of their directorships in 
the same industry while about 10 percent of these directors have all their outside 
  37 
 
 
 
directorships in other industries. The number of non-industry busy outside directors is 
over one-third of the number of busy outside directors. 
In addition, according to the correlations reported in Table 6, the percentage of 
non-industry busy outside directors are positively associated with the percentage of 
outside directors but this association is not observed between the percentage of outside 
directors and the percentage of industry busy outside directors. Furthermore, industry and 
non-industry busy outside directors are negatively related to several firm characteristics. 
For example, the percentage of industry busy outside directors is associated with low 
agency conflicts (i.e. low governance index), young firms, and firms with high growth 
opportunities (i.e. high Tobin’s q). In contrast, the percentage of non-industry busy 
outside directors is associated with high agency conflicts (i.e. high governance index), 
low inside ownership, old firms, and large firms. Potentially, industry and non-industry 
busy outside directors could have different impact on shareholder value. Thus, our first 
research question is whether industry or non-industry busy outside directors adds value to 
acquiring firms during the acquisition announcements. 
Directors from large firms or directors who are CEOs of large firms are more 
likely to receive additional directorships [Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003)]. The 
size and complexity of the operations in large firms suggests that these directors may be 
more skillful and may provide broader networking contacts to firms in which they serve 
on their boards. Similarly, Fama and Jensen (1983) indicate that serving as directors on 
other boards could signal the executive’s competence. Kaplan and Reishus (1990), 
Shivdasani (1993), and Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) among others offer empirical 
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evidence to support this notion. Fich (2005) further finds a positive shareholder reaction 
to the appointment of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms. With this in mind, 
the value of a director’s skills and networking contacts may be even more pronounced if 
the director is also the CEO of an S&P 500 firm, which tends to be a leader in its industry 
[see Cai (2007)]. Since directors with CEO titles in S&P 500 firms are likely to be 
attractive candidates for other boards, do these directors lead to better firm performance 
than do other busy outside directors who are not S&P 500 firm CEOs? Furthermore, do 
multiple directorships add value to outside directors with CEO titles in S&P 500 firms? 
Do busy outside directors with a CEO title in a S&P 500 firm differ from busy outside 
directors with a CEO title in a non-S&P 500 firm? 
As shown on Panel B of Table 5, about two thirds of busy outside directors have 
either directorship(s) or CEO title(s) in S&P 500 firm(s) and one third of busy outside 
directors (9.4 percent of outside directors) having a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm. Non-
S&P500 busy outside directors are about 10 percent of total outside directors in our  
 
Table 6 
Correlation 
 
The sample consists of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004. Outside directors are defined as busy if they 
hold three or more directorships. Industry busy outside directors are busy outside directors with at least 
50% of their directorships sharing the same 2-digit SIC code. Non-industry busy outside directors are busy 
outside directors with all outside directorships in other industries classified by 2-digit SIC code. SP500-
CEO busy outside directors are busy outside directors with a CEO title in a S&P 500 firm. Non-SP500 busy 
outside directors are busy outside directors not current employees or directors of S&P 500 firms. CAR (-2, 
2) is the equal-weighted five-day cumulative abnormal return in percentage points calculated using the 
market model. Governance index is constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Firm age is the 
number of years since the stock inclusion in the CRSP database. Tobin’s q is calculated as market value of 
common equity plus preferred stock liquidating value, plus long term debt, minus short-term assets, plus 
short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total assets. 
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Table 6 – Continue 
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Percentage of busy outside directors 0.281           
 (0.00)           
Percentage of industry busy outside directors -0.040 0.225          
 (0.32) (0.00)          
Percentage of non-industry busy outside directors 0.216 0.627 -0.081         
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)         
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors 0.247 0.562 0.011 0.522        
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.78) (0.00)        
Percentage of non-SP500 busy outside directors 0.070 0.487 0.336 0.035 -0.052       
 (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.20)       
CAR (-2, 2) 0.049 0.001 -0.025 0.070 0.093 -0.061      
 (0.22) (0.98) (0.53) (0.08) (0.02) (0.13)      
Governance index  0.274 0.058 -0.086 0.093 0.023 0.041 -0.001     
 (0.00) (0.17) (0.04) (0.03) (0.59) (0.33) (0.98)     
Inside ownership -0.307 -0.099 -0.040 -0.095 -0.094 0.038 0.004 -0.145    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.32) (0.02) (0.02) (0.34) (0.92) (0.00)    
Firm age 0.303 0.164 -0.154 0.233 0.206 -0.088 0.075 0.322 -0.271   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)   
Total assets 0.042 0.178 -0.058 0.201 0.128 -0.037 0.008 -0.094 -0.053 0.068  
 (0.29) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.84) (0.03) (0.18) (0.09)  
Tobin’s q -0.035 0.126 0.085 0.037 0.161 0.017 0.039 -0.184 -0.007 -0.128 -0.060 
 (0.38) (0.00) (0.03) (0.36) (0.00) (0.68) (0.33) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.13) 
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sample and about one third of total busy outside directors. While this evidence is 
consistent with the notion that multiple directorships are large firm phenomenon [see 
Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006)], the 
characteristics of busy outside directors with a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm (we will call 
them SP500-CEO busy outside directors) are similar to non-industry busy outside 
directors as shown in Table 6, except that the percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside 
directors is associated with high growth opportunities (i.e. high Tobin’s q). The 
percentage of non-SP500 busy outside directors, in contrast, is not significantly related to 
governance index, inside ownership, total assets, or Tobin’s q. However, similar to the 
percentage of industry busy outside directors, the percentage of non-SP500 busy outside 
directors is negatively associated with firm age. Once again, busy outside directors could 
be different and the difference could have different impacts on shareholder wealth. 
Previous studies find that diversifying acquisitions tend to destroy shareholder 
wealth [see, for example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)].  Busy outside directors 
with directorship(s) in the target industry could potentially protect shareholder interests 
by accurately evaluating the target, given their experience in the target industry, thereby 
preventing value-reducing acquisitions by management. Thus, these industry busy 
outside directors could be different and could have a different implication for the 
relationship between shareholder value and busy outside directors. In short, we examine 
in this essay whether different types of busy directors may have different effects on firm 
value and we capture the characteristics of busy outside directors from a perspective that 
has not been done before.  
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3. The Sample and Variables 
A. The Sample Selection Process 
Examining acquirer returns around acquisitions sidesteps the potential 
endogeneity problem and allows us to observe whether outside directors play their role to 
protect shareholder interests when there are potential agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders.  
We first obtain a sample of acquisitions from the Securities Data Corporation’s 
(SDC) data. Shareholder reaction to acquisitions could be different based on the target’s 
public status because the choice between a public and a private target could be related to 
the acquirer’s managerial motive [see Jensen (1986), Roll (1986), and Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)], the availability of target information [Chang (1998)], 
or target bargaining power [Ang and Kohers (2001)]. Because these factors potentially 
bias our analyses in the relationship between busy outside directors and acquirer returns, 
we exclude private targets from our sample.   
Observations in our sample must meet the following criteria: (1) The 
announcement date is between 1998 and 2004; (2) the acquirer controls less than 50% of 
the shares of the target at the announcement date and controls 100% of the shares after 
the transaction; (3) the deal value is at least $1 million; and (4) data on acquirer stock 
prices, accounting variables, and director information are available from CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT, and EDGAR data retrieval system, respectively. Following these criteria, 
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we obtain a sample of 854 firm-year acquisitions made by 476 acquirers. Within 854 
observations, 299 are diversifying acquisitions made by 200 acquirers. 
Table 7 reports the sample distribution by announcement year. Consistent with 
related studies, the number of acquisitions increased at the end of 1990’s (beginning in 
1998) and then dropped year by year to 2002. In 2003 and 2004, the number of 
acquisitions increased about 16% from 67 to 78, and about 20% from 67 to 81, 
respectively. Similarly, the medians of market capitalization (calculated as the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the year end prior to announcement 
date) and deal value (calculated as the value of transaction, excluding fees and expenses) 
are relatively high around 2000. However, while the medians of acquirer market 
capitalization remain low in recent years, the medians of deal value and relative deal size 
increase in both 2003 and 2004. 
Table 7 
Sample Distribution 
 
The sample consists of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004. Market capitalization is calculated as the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the year end prior to announcement date. 
Deal value is the value of transaction, excluding fees and expenses. Both market capitalization and deal 
value are measured in millions. Relative deal size is deal value over acquirer’s market capitalization. 
Year 
Number of 
acquisitions 
Percentage of 
sample 
Median acquirer 
market capitalization
 
Median deal value 
Median relative 
deal size 
1998 166 19.4 5,542 301 0.09 
1999 188 22.0 6,405 402 0.08 
2000 155 18.1 6,652 453 0.09 
2001 119 13.9 6,013 182 0.06 
2002 67 7.8 4,121 149 0.05 
2003 78 9.1 3,342 281 0.11 
2004 81 9.5 3,487 528 0.11 
  
 
B. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample  
B.1. Board Characteristics 
  43 
 
 
 
Outside directors are defined as directors without any affiliation with the firm. As 
in other related studies, board members in our sample firms are dominated by outside 
directors. The average (median) percentage of busy outside directors is about 33 percent. 
It is smaller than the 52 percent reported by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) because our 
sample is not restricted to large firms. Outside directors are defined as being busy if they 
hold at least three directorships.  
To capture the differences among busy outside directors, we focus on the industry 
characteristics and large firm characteristics of outside directorships held by busy outside 
directors. Industry busy outside directors are busy outside directors with at least 50 
percent of their directorships in firms sharing the same 2-digit SIC code [Ferris, 
Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003)]. 14 These directors potentially have superior talent in a 
given industry. In contrast, non-industry busy outside directors are busy outside directors 
with all outside directorships in other industries, who may have a great diversity of 
experience. In addition, these directors are associated with large firms and could be more 
skillful due to the complexity of operations they oversee. Table 5 indicates that more than 
50 percent of acquirers do not have these directors and both the average and median 
percentages of industry and non-industry busy outside directors are small.   
The variable that captures large firm characteristics of busy outside directors—
percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors—is the percentage of outside directors 
who have at least three directorships and who also have a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm. 
                                                 
14 Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) include industry directors, not 
restricted to outside directors, as a dummy variable for their analysis of the association between firm 
performance and multiple directorships. 
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The variable, percentage of non-SP500 busy outside directors, captures the busy outside 
directors without either a CEO title or directorship(s) in an S&P 500 firm(s). These two 
variables allow us to examine if experience from serving on the board of a large firm and 
experience from managing a large firm add value to busy outside directors. In addition, 
we also capture busy outside directors with a CEO title only in a non-S&P 500 firm to 
see whether these directors are different from SP500-CEO busy outside directors. As 
shown in Panel A of Table 5, the percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors and 
the percentage of non-SP500 busy outside directors comprise more than 50 percent of 
busy outside directors, while the rest of the busy outside directors have directorships in 
S&P 500 firms but do not have a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm. The lower percentage of 
non-SP500-CEO busy outside directors suggests that directors with a CEO title in an 
S&P 500 firm could be more attractive as board members than busy outside directors 
with a CEO title in a non-S&P 500 firm. 
The average (median) number of directorships held by outside directors in our 
sample is about 2.23 (2.17). Other than outside directors and directorships held by outside 
directors, we employ three control variables which potentially affect shareholder value. 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) report a negative association 
between board size and firm value. We measure board size by the number of directors on 
the board. Management ownership signals the alignment of management and shareholder 
interests [Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)]. We 
capture this effect by measuring the percentage of shares held by firm insiders. While the 
evidence on the relationship between firm performance and CEO duality is generally 
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mixed [see, for examples, Rechner and Dalton (1991) and Daily and Dalton (1992)], 
being a dual CEO—the CEO is also the chairman of the board—could reduce the 
effectiveness of board monitoring. We use a CEO chairman indicator to capture CEO 
duality, which is 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and is 0 if otherwise.  
 
B.2 Abnormal Returns  
To measure acquirer returns, we compute both three-day (-1, 1) and five-day (-2, 
2) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the acquisition announcement period. 
From a random sample, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) report that about 92.6 
percent of announcement dates from SDC are accurate and the rest are within at most two 
days of the actual announcement dates. Therefore, five-day CARs potentially capture 
most announcement effect during acquisitions. We use the CRSP equal-weighted return 
as the market return and estimate the market model parameters over the period from 
event day -210 to event day -11. As shown on Panel A of Table 5, the average (median) 
five-day CARs is -1.72 (-1.20), similar to the CARs reported by Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007) for acquisitions of public targets.  
 
B.4. Control Variables 
Acquirer returns could be affected by several other factors. Accordingly, we 
control for acquirer and deal characteristics in our regressions and provide summary 
statistics for these variables in Table 5. For acquirer characteristics, Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) report a negative association between acquirer 
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announcement returns and bidder size. We measure bidder size by market capitalization, 
measured as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the year 
end prior to announcement date. We calculate Tobin’s q as market value of common 
equity plus preferred stock liquidating value, plus long-term debt, minus short-term assets, 
plus short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total assets [Chung and Pruitt (1994)]. 
Variable values for Tobin’s q are at the year end prior to announcement date. While free 
cash flow may exacerbate the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, 
debt may prevent firms from wasting resources [Jensen (1986)]. We calculate free cash 
flow as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, income taxes, and 
capital expenditures scaled by book value of total assets. Financial leverage is the book 
value of long-term debt and short-term debt over market value of total assets. Finally, we 
control for acquirer pre-announcement stock price run-up measured as the acquirer’s buy-
and-hold abnormal return from event day -210 to event day -11 with the CRSP value-
weighted market index as the benchmark to proxy firm performance.  
Deal characteristics include method of payment, relative deal size, and indicators 
of intrastate, diversifying acquisition, and tender offer. Travlos (1987), Servaes (1991), 
and Brown and Ryngaert (1991) among others have found that the method of payment 
affects acquirer returns. We use a cash deal indicator to capture payment method, which 
is 0 if the acquisition is financed partially or fully with stock and is 1 if otherwise. Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) suggest that diversifying acquisitions could benefit managers 
at the expense of shareholders. We define a diversifying acquisition as one in which the 
acquirer and the target do not share the same 2-digit SIC code. Relative deal size may 
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also affect acquirer returns during acquisitions [Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2004)]. We calculate relative deal size as the deal value of acquirer market capitalization 
at the year end prior to the acquisition. Finally, geographical distance between the 
acquirer and the target may proxy for the availability of information, and we use an 
intrastate indicator to capture acquisitions in which acquirers and targets are within the 
same state. As shown in Table 5, most acquisitions in our sample are financed with stock. 
About 40 percent are diversifying acquisitions. Tender offers comprise 24 percent in our 
sample, and about 20 percent of acquisitions involve acquirers and targets within the 
same state.    
 
4. Empirical Results 
A. Multivariate Tests 
In Table 8, we apply OLS regression to test the relationship between acquirer 
returns and busy outside directors. The dependent variable is the five-day cumulative 
abnormal return [CARs (-2, 2)]. In regression (1), we first test the relationship between 
busy outside directors and acquirer returns without considering the characteristics of busy 
outside directors. Consistent with Ahn, Jiraporn, and Kim (2008), we find that acquirer 
returns are negatively associated with the percentage of busy outside directors, suggesting 
that multiple directorships reduce the effectiveness of monitoring by outside directors 
[Fich and Shivdasani (2006)]. However, when variables indicating the characteristics of 
busy outside directors are added into regressions, we find that some types of busy outside 
directors are differently associated with acquirer returns. In regression (3), for example, 
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the coefficient for the percentage of non-industry busy outside directors suggests that 
these busy outside directors do not reduce acquirer returns. While a one percent increase 
of busy outside directors reduces five-day CARs by about 0.05 percentage points, if the 
increased busy outside directors are non-industry busy outside directors, the reduced 
CARs could be recovered and the total impact from non-industry busy outside directors 
on acquirer returns is not different from non-busy outside directors (i.e. 0.046 percent 
increase in five-day CARs).  
The coefficient for the percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors, as 
shown in regression (4), suggests that busy outside directors with a CEO title in an S&P 
500 firm are not associated with negative acquirer returns. One percentage increase of 
  
Table 8 
Busy Outside Directors and Acquirer Returns 
 
The sample consists of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004. The dependent variable is the acquirer’s equal-
weighted five-day (-2, 2) cumulative abnormal return in percentage points calculated using the market 
model. Outside directors are defined as busy if they hold three or more directorships. Industry busy outside 
directors are busy outside directors with at least 50% of their directorships sharing the same 2-digit SIC 
code. Non-industry busy outside directors are busy outside directors with all outside directorships in other 
industries classified by 2-digit SIC code. SP500-CEO busy outside directors are busy outside directors with 
a CEO title in a S&P 500 firm. Non-SP500 busy outside directors are busy outside directors not current 
employees or directors of S&P 500 firms. Board size measures the number of directors. Acquirer’s pre-
announcement stock price run-up is acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal return during the period (-210, -11) 
with the CRSP value-weighted market index as the benchmark. Free cash flow is calculated as operating 
income before depreciation minus interest expenses, income taxes, and capital expenditures scaled by book 
value of total assets. Leverage is the book value of long-term debts and short-term debts over market value 
of total assets. Tobin’s q is calculated as market value of common equity plus preferred stock liquidating 
value, plus long term debt, minus short-term assets, plus short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total 
assets. Relative deal size is deal value over acquirer’s market capitalization.  Market capitalization, 
measured in millions, is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the 
year end prior to announcement date. Diversifying acquisitions are acquisitions in which acquirers and 
targets do not share a 2-digit SIC code. Intrastate is a dummy indicator and is 1 if acquirer and target are in 
the same state. The t-statistics is reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance 
based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 – Continue 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -3.719** -3.553** -5.426*** -5.271*** -2.603* 
 (-2.38) (-2.47) (-2.78) (-3.01) (-1.69) 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors  -1.439    
  (-0.24)    
Percentage of non-industry busy outside   5.726**   
        directors   (2.16)   
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside    8.034**  
        directors    (2.40)  
Percentage of non-SP500 busy outside      -3.267 
        directors     (-1.19) 
Percentage of outside directors 4.695* 4.596* 4.623* 4.300* 4.659* 
 (1.90) (1.87) (1.88) (1.74) (1.89) 
Log (board size) 0.602 0.564 0.518 0.523 0.535 
 (0.41) (0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) 
Log (inside ownership) 0.523 0.511 0.503 0.560 0.545 
 (1.42) (1.40) (1.38) (1.53) (1.48) 
CEO chairman -0.663 -0.672 -0.698 -0.660 -0.657 
 (-0.88) (-0.89) (-0.93) (-0.88) (-0.88) 
Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price -3.394*** -3.404*** -3.412*** -3.429*** -3.450***
    run-up (-3.65) (-3.70) (-3.65) (-3.67) (-3.71) 
Free cash flow -5.492 -5.674 -5.850 -5.718 -5.613 
 (-0.44) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.46) (-0.45) 
Leverage 3.240 3.103 3.399 3.667 3.176 
 (0.89) (0.89) (0.93) (0.99) (0.87) 
Log (total asset) 0.285 0.273 0.193 0.236 0.224 
 (1.13) (1.12) (0.78) (0.94) (0.88) 
Log (firm age) -0.185 -0.202 -0.246 -0.236 -0.241 
 (-0.36) (-0.40) (-0.48) (-0.47) (-0.48) 
Tobin’s q 0.414** 0.416** 0.438** 0.398** 0.405** 
 (2.30) (2.33) (2.45) (2.20) (2.24) 
Intrastate 0.931 0.952 0.968 0.914 0.958 
 (0.86) (0.88) (0.90) (0.85) (0.89) 
Relative deal size -3.416*** -3.420*** -3.303*** -3.369*** -3.358***
 (-3.08) (-3.08) (-3.04) (-3.05) (-3.07) 
All-cash deal 1.849*** 1.853*** 1.844*** 1.767*** 1.771***
 (2.72) (2.72) (2.73) (2.61) (2.60) 
Diversifying acquisitions -0.785 -0.786 -0.745 -0.751 -0.773 
 (-1.14) (-1.14) (-1.09) (-1.10) (-1.13) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 
 
busy outside directors with a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm potentially recovers the 
negative acquirer returns caused by multiple directorships held by busy outside directors, 
and in fact increases acquirer returns by about 0.03 percentage points [i.e. 0.08 + (-0.05)] 
although this positive return is not significantly different from zero. However, similar to 
non-industry busy outside directors, SP500-CEO busy outside directors are not different 
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from non-busy outside directors and also improve acquirer returns by about 0.04 
percentage points.15  
For industry busy outside directors and non-SP500 busy outside directors, as 
shown respectively in regression (2) and (5), we do not find positive or significant 
coefficients for these variables, suggesting that these busy outside directors are not 
different from most busy outside directors.  A one percent increase of industry or non-
SP500 busy outside directors could reduce acquirer returns by 0.04 or 0.03 percentage 
points, respectively. Although the coefficients for the percentage of busy outside 
directors are different in regression (2) and (5) because of the potential difference 
between industry and non-SP500 busy outside directors, the difference is not significantly 
different from zero. Combining the results from all regressions reported in Table 8, we 
see that while busy outside directors are negatively associated with five-day CARs during 
acquisitions, not all busy outside directors are the same. Non-industry busy outside 
directors and SP500-CEO busy outside directors are associated with more outside 
directorships, directorships in different industries, and directorships in large firms. 
Potentially, these directors with their great diversity of experience could be valuable 
source of knowledge to the firms in which they serve on their boards. However, while we 
                                                 
15 While the coefficient of the percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors in regression (4) is greater 
than the coefficient of the percentage of non-industry busy outside directors in regression (3), the difference 
between these two coefficients is not significantly different from zero. Although the correlation between 
non-industry busy outside directors and SP500-CEO busy outside directors as shown on Table 2 is 0.522 
and significant, indicating busy outside directors with a CEO title in S&P 500 firms are likely to hold 
directorships in different industries and vice versa, our results still hold when we drop acquirers with both 
types of busy outside directors.  Among 1,556 busy outside directors, 221 busy outside directors are non-
industry busy outside directors and in the meantime have a CEO title in S&P 500 firms. Among 854 
acquirers, 193 acquirers have both non-industry busy outside directors and SP500-CEO busy outside 
directors. 
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find these directors could be better than other busy outside directors, we do not find the 
evidence that these directors are better than non-busy outside directors.16 
Our results also indicate a positive association between the percentage of outside 
directors and acquirer returns during acquisitions. A one percent increase of outside 
directors, without considering the characteristics of individual outside directors, improves 
five-day CARs by about 0.05 percentage points. Similar to Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007), we find negative and significant coefficients for acquirer pre-announcement stock 
price run-up. Consistent with Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) and Servaes (1991), we 
find a positive association between Tobin’s q and acquirer returns. Relative deal size is 
negatively associated with acquirer returns [Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)]. 
Cash deal is positively associated with acquirer returns [see, for example, Travlos (1987)]. 
While coefficients for several control variables are not significant in our regressions, 
most of these variables obtain the signs similar to other related studies. For example, 
negative coefficients are found for free cash flow, diversifying acquisitions, and CEO 
duality. Positive coefficients are found for inside ownership, leverage, and intrastate 
indicator.       
 
B. Robustness Tests 
                                                 
16 It is possible that busy outside directors with a CEO title in S&P 500 firms or with directorships in other 
industries are invited to join the board before the announcement of acquisitions to enhance shareholder 
wealth. However, the average (median) tenure in the sample is 6.77 (5) years for busy outside directors 
with a CEO title in S&P 500 firms and is 8.19 (6) years for busy outside directors with directorships in 
other industries. These tenure characteristics suggest that strategically hiring busy outside directors shortly 
before a merger announcement is not prevalent. 
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To check the robustness of our main results, we apply several additional tests as 
reported in Table 9. First, acquirers may have multiple acquisitions within a short time 
and the calculation of acquirer returns of individual acquisitions could be biased by other 
acquisitions within this period. Therefore, we exclude observations with multiple 
acquisitions within a year and redo the Table 8 regressions. The sample that excludes 
multiple acquisitions consists of 470 acquisitions made by 331 acquirers. Similar results 
are obtained in Panel A of Table 9. We find that firms with non-industry busy outside 
directors and firms with SP500-CEO busy outside directors reduce the negative acquirer 
returns caused by multiple directorships held by busy outside directors. In Panel B, we 
replace the percentage measures of particular types of busy outside directors by dummy 
variables. For example, the variable, with SP500-CEO busy outside director(s), is 1 if 
there is at least 1 SP500-CEO busy outside directors on the board and 0 if otherwise. 
Although the sizes of the coefficients in regression (3) and (4) are relative small 
compared with those reported in Table 8, our previous findings remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
Table 9 
Busy Outside Directors and Acquirer Returns – Robustness Tests 
 
The sample consists of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004. In Panel A, observations with multiple 
acquisitions within a year are excluded. The dependent variable in Panel A and B is the acquirer’s equal-
weighted five-day (-2, 2) cumulative abnormal return in percentage points calculated using the market 
model. Outside directors are defined as busy if they hold three or more directorships. Industry busy outside 
directors are busy outside directors with at least 50% of their directorships sharing the same 2-digit SIC 
code. Non-industry busy outside directors are busy outside directors with all outside directorships in other 
industries classified by 2-digit SIC code. SP500-CEO busy outside directors are busy outside directors with 
a CEO title in a S&P 500 firm. Non-SP500 busy outside directors are busy outside directors not current 
employees or directors of S&P 500 firms. Additional variables are all other variables as shown on Table 8. 
The t-statistics is reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance based on two-sided 
tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 - Continue 
 
Panel A: Exclude multiple acquisitions 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -4.523*** -4.392*** -5.882*** -5.488*** -3.653** 
 (-2.57) (-2.72) (-2.79) (-2.83) (-2.16) 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors  -0.993    
  (-0.17)    
Percentage of non-industry busy outside   5.180*   
        directors   (1.83)   
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside    5.665*  
        directors    (1.65)  
Percentage of non-SP500 busy outside     -2.432 
        directors     (-0.82) 
Additional variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Panel B: Alternative measures of busy outside directors 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -4.523*** -4.472*** -5.607*** -5.467*** -4.586***
 (-2.57) (-2.59) (-2.87) (-2.97) (-2.65) 
With industry busy outside director(s)   -0.136    
  (-0.12)    
With non-industry busy outside director(s)   1.469*   
   (1.68)   
With SP500-CEO busy outside director(s)    1.645**  
    (1.97)  
With non-SP500 busy outside director(s)     0.069 
     (0.09) 
Additional variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 
Panel C: CAR (-1, 1) equal-weighted 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -3.100** -2.340* -4.977*** -4.523*** -1.181 
 (-2.21) (-1.78) (-2.84) (-2.84) (-0.85) 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors  -6.567    
  (-1.35)    
Percentage of non-industry busy outside   6.298***   
        directors   (2.72)   
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside    7.371**  
        directors    (2.50)  
Percentage of non-SP500 busy outside     -5.620** 
        directors     (-2.33) 
Additional variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Panel D: CAR (-2, 2) value-weighted 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -3.845** -3.667** -5.274*** -5.258*** -2.882* 
 (-2.39) (-2.51) (2.02) (-2.89) (-1.83) 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors  -1.540    
  (-0.26)    
Percentage of non-industry busy outside   4.793*   
        directors   (1.82)   
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside    7.313**  
        directors    (2.16)  
Percentage of non-SP500 busy outside     -2.820 
        directors     (-1.05) 
Additional variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
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Table 9 - Continue 
 
Panel E: CAR (-1, 1) value-weighted 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -3.397** -2.619** -5.245*** -4.745*** -1.483 
 (-2.39) (-1.99) (-2.96)  (-1.08) 
Percentage of industry busy outside directors  -6.715    
  (-1.41)    
Percentage of non-industry busy outside   6.201***   
        directors   (2.68)   
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside    6.980**  
        directors    (2.30)  
Percentage of non-SP500 busy outside     -5.604** 
        directors     (-2.36) 
Additional variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
 
In Panel C, five-day CARs are replaced by three-day CARs (-1, 1). While 
coefficients for the percentage of non-industry busy outside directors and the percentage 
of SP500-CEO busy outside directors remain significantly positive, the percentage of 
non-SP500 busy outside directors is found to be significantly negatively associated with 
acquirer returns, indicating that these busy outside directors potentially reduce 
shareholder value. In addition, the insignificant coefficient for the percentage of busy 
outside directors in regression (5) suggests that the negative impact from busy outside 
directors on acquirer returns could be dominated by non-SP500 busy outside directors.  
In Panels (D) and (E), we employ the CRSP value-weighted return as the market 
return to estimate the market model parameters over the period and then calculate the 
three-day (-1, 1) and five-day (-2, 2) CARs. Panel (D) shows results that are consistent 
with those reported in Table 8, and results on Panel (E) are also similar to those on Panel 
(C). The coefficient for percentage of non-SP500 busy outside directors remains negative 
and significant when three-day CARs is applied.   
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C. Diversifying Acquisitions 
In this section, we focus on diversifying acquisitions in which acquirers and 
targets do not share the same 2-digit SIC code. Diversifying acquisitions could be driven 
by managerial objectives and potentially destroy shareholder value [Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1990)]).17 If outside directors protect shareholder wealth, outside directors with 
directorship(s) in the target industry could have better information about the target 
industry and therefore could be better at evaluating the target. As a consequence, these 
directors could be more valuable than other outside directors for acquirer shareholders. 
However, our evidence in Table 10 indicates that busy outside directors with 
directorship(s) in the target industry are not better than other busy outside directors. The 
coefficients for the percentage of busy outside directors with directorship(s) in target 
industry in regression (3) and (5) are positive but insignificant.  This finding suggests that 
while outside directors improve acquirer returns by about 9 percentage points, busy 
outside directors including busy outside directors with directorship(s) in the target 
industry appear to reduce acquirer firm returns. Not reported in the table, non-busy 
outside directors (i.e. outside directors with only two directorships) with directorship in 
the target industry are not different from industry busy outside directors as well during 
diversifying acquisitions. 
In contrast, we still find busy outside directors with a CEO title in an S&P 500 
firm perform better than other busy outside directors. While the impact from the 
 
                                                 
17 Recent studies such as Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) indicate diversification may not 
necessarily reduce firm value. 
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Table 10 
Diversifying Acquisitions 
 
The sample consists of 299 diversifying acquisitions from 1998 to 2004. Diversifying acquisitions are 
acquisitions in which acquirers and targets do not share a 2-digit SIC code. In regression (1), (2), and (3), 
the dependent variable is the acquirer’s equal-weighted five-day (-2, 2) cumulative abnormal return in 
percentage points calculated using the market model. Value-weighted five-day (-2, 2) cumulative abnormal 
return in percentage points is applied in regression (4) and (5). Outside directors are defined as busy if they 
hold three or more directorships. SP500-CEO busy outside directors are busy outside directors with a CEO 
title in a S&P 500 firm. Board size measures the number of directors. Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock 
price run-up is acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal return during the period (-210, -11) with the CRSP value-
weighted market index as the benchmark. Free cash flow is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation minus interest expenses, income taxes, and capital expenditures scaled by book value of total 
assets. Leverage is the book value of long-term debts and short-term debts over market value of total assets. 
Tobin’s q is calculated as market value of common equity plus preferred stock liquidating value, plus long 
term debt, minus short-term assets, plus short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total assets. Relative deal 
size is deal value over acquirer’s market capitalization.  Market capitalization, measured in millions, is 
calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the year end prior to 
announcement date. Intrastate is a dummy indicator and is 1 if acquirer and target are in the same state. The 
t-statistics is reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance based on two-sided 
tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -4.126* -6.206** -4.822** -6.791** -5.225** 
 (-1.66) (-2.23) (-1.98) (-2.57) (-2.19) 
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside  10.72**  11.81**  
        directors  (1.94)  (2.24)  
Percentage of busy outside directors with   2.160  2.256 
directorships(s) in target industry   (0.65)  (0.75) 
Percentage of outside directors 9.889** 8.897** 9.888** 8.236* 9.327** 
 (2.38) (2.11) (2.37) (1.93) (2.22) 
Log (board size) 2.476 2.219 2.670 2.693 3.179 
 (1.08) (1.00) (1.19) (1.26) (1.46) 
Log (inside ownership) 0.794 0.820 0.790 1.111 1.078 
 (1.05) (1.09) (1.05) (1.49) (1.44) 
CEO chairman -1.116 -1.093 -1.180 -1.148 -1.241 
 (-0.94) (-0.92) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.08) 
Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price -1.855** -1.904** -1.867** -2.101*** -2.060***
    run-up (-2.35) (-2.23) (-2.35) (-2.65) (-2.84) 
Free cash flow 8.580 8.383 7.001 1.816 0.384 
 (0.71) (0.70) (0.58) (0.15) (0.03) 
Leverage 1.076 1.388 1.093 0.533 0.206 
 (0.27) (0.34) (0.27) (0.13) (0.05) 
Log (total asset) 0.276 0.186 0.269 0.424 0.516 
 (0.63) (0.43) (0.61) (1.03) (1.24) 
Log (firm age) 0.480 0.525 0.519 0.178 0.169 
 (0.57) (0.63) (0.63) (0.22) (0.21) 
Tobin’s q 0.172 0.133 0.181 0.231 0.283 
 (0.52) (0.41) (0.55) (0.79) (0.96) 
Intrastate 2.452 2.423 2.489 2.020 2.090 
 (1.24) (1.23) (1.26) (1.04) (1.07) 
Relative deal size -7.281*** -7.466*** -7.208*** -7.342*** -7.062***
 (-3.31) (-3.49) (-3.30) (-3.43) (-3.25) 
All-cash deal 1.259 0.935 1.377 1.156 1.636 
 (1.17) (0.87) (1.28) (1.13) (1.58) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.22 
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percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors on acquirer returns offsets the impact 
from the percentage of busy outside directors, SP500-CEO busy outside directors still 
improve acquirer returns by about 9 percentage points, which is the coefficients of the 
percentage of outside directors. It should be noted that using directorships in the target 
industry to proxy for the experience of busy outside directors could be inappropriate 
because the director could obtain experience in the target industry from other sources, 
such as previously being an employee in target industry.  Overall, the results reported in 
Table 10 are consistent with our earlier findings that some busy outside directors are 
better than others.18    
 
D. Multiple Directorships and CEO Title 
D.1 Do Multiple Directorships Add Value to Directors Who Are CEOs of Other Firms? 
In regression (4) of Table 8, we report a positive and significant coefficient for the 
percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors, indicating that these busy outside 
directors could offset the negative impact from multiple directorships held by busy 
outside directors on acquirer returns. However, these busy outside directors with a CEO 
title in an S&P 500 firm are not better than non-busy outside directors. We might, 
therefore, question whether multiple directorships reduce the value of holding a CEO title 
in an S&P 500 firm. To address this issue, we develop a variable, percentage of SP500-
CEO non-busy outside directors, to compare with the percentage of SP500-CEO busy 
                                                 
18 Not reported in Table 11, we test the relationship between five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
and the percentage of non-industry busy outside directors. The coefficient for the percentage of non-
industry busy outside directors is 6.306 with t-statistics of 1.37.     
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outside directors. As shown on Table 11, while the coefficients for the percentage of 
SP500-CEO non-busy outside directors are insignificant in all regressions, we observe 
positive and significant coefficients for the percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside 
directors. The positive impact from SP500-CEO busy outside directors on acquirer 
returns recovers the negative impact from multiple directorships held by busy outside 
directors. Thus, our results indicate that CEOs of S&P 500 firms who hold multiple 
directorships are not less valuable members of the board than CEOs of S&P 500 firms 
who are not busy.  
 
D.2 Are SP500-CEO Busy Outside Directors Better than Non-SP500-CEO Busy Outside 
Directors? 
Table 11 
S&P 500-CEO Busy and Non-Busy Outside directors 
 
The sample consists of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004. In regression (1), and (2) the dependent 
variable is the acquirer’s equal-weighted five-day (-2, 2) cumulative abnormal return in percentage points 
calculated using the market model. Value-weighted five-day (-2, 2) cumulative abnormal return in 
percentage points is applied in regression (3) and (4). Outside directors are defined as busy if they hold 
three or more directorships. SP500-CEO busy (non-busy) outside directors are busy (non-busy) outside 
directors with a CEO title in a S&P 500 firm. Board size measures the number of directors. Acquirer’s pre-
announcement stock price run-up is acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal return during the period (-210, -11) 
with the CRSP value-weighted market index as the benchmark. Free cash flow is calculated as operating 
income before depreciation minus interest expenses, income taxes, and capital expenditures scaled by book 
value of total assets. Leverage is the book value of long-term debts and short-term debts over market value 
of total assets. Tobin’s q is calculated as market value of common equity plus preferred stock liquidating 
value, plus long term debt, minus short-term assets, plus short-term liabilities, and then scaled by total 
assets. Relative deal size is deal value over acquirer’s market capitalization.  Market capitalization, 
measured in millions, is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the 
year end prior to announcement date. Diversifying acquisitions are acquisitions in which acquirers and 
targets do not share a 2-digit SIC code. Intrastate is a dummy indicator and is 1 if acquirer and target are in 
the same state. The t-statistics is reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance 
based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 11 – Continue 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -3.693** -5.260*** -3.802** -5.241*** 
 (-2.36) (-3.00) (-2.35) (-2.87) 
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors  8.142**  7.477** 
  (2.43)  (2.21) 
Percentage of SP500-CEO non-busy outside directors 3.053 3.756 5.060 5.705 
 (0.57) (0.71) (0.92) (1.04) 
Percentage of outside directors 4.567* 4.136* 3.649 3.254 
 (1.83) (1.66) (1.40) (1.25) 
Log (board size) 0.541 0.447 0.432 0.346 
 (0.37) (0.31) (0.29) (0.24) 
Log (inside ownership) 0.529 0.567 0.561 0.597 
 (1.43) (1.55) (1.49) (1.59) 
CEO chairman -0.650 -0.644 -0.682 -0.676 
 (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.90) (-0.89) 
Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up -3.394*** -3.428*** -4.020*** -4.052*** 
 (-3.65) (-3.67) (-4.00) (-4.01) 
Free cash flow -5.492 -5.721 -5.341 -5.551 
 (-0.44) (-0.46) (-0.42) (-0.43) 
Leverage 3.228 3.658 2.563 2.958 
 (0.88) (0.99) (0.68) (0.78) 
Log (total asset) 0.283 0.233 0.393 0.347 
 (1.12) (0.93) (1.55) (1.38) 
Log (firm age) -0.195 -0.249 -0.421 -0.470 
 (-0.38) (-0.49) (-0.81) (-0.91) 
Tobin’s q 0.409** 0.392** 0.423** 0.407** 
 (2.29) (2.19) (2.24) (2.15) 
Intrastate 0.970 0.961 1.007 0.998 
 (0.89) (0.88) (0.92) (0.91) 
Relative deal size -3.456*** -3.418*** -3.793*** -3.758*** 
 (-3.15) (-3.13) (-3.34) (-3.32) 
All-cash deal 1.838*** 1.751*** 1.797*** 1.717*** 
 (2.71) (2.60) (2.71) (2.61) 
Diversifying acquisitions -0.792 -0.758 -0.640 -0.609 
 (-1.15) (-1.10) (-0.93) (-0.88) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 
 
Finally, if busy outside directors with a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm are better 
than other busy outside directors, we might question whether a CEO title in an S&P 500 
firm is different from a CEO title in a non-S&P 500 firm. To address this issue, we 
measure the percentage of non-SP500-CEO busy outside directors to compare with the 
percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors. As reported in Table 12, the relatively 
small and insignificant coefficients for the percentage of non-SP500-CEO busy outside 
directors indicate that busy outside directors with a CEO title in a non-S&P 500 firm 
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could be different from busy outside directors with a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm. Busy 
outside directors with a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm could recover the negative impact 
from multiple directorships held by busy outside directors on acquirer returns as we 
found in previous sections. However, similar evidence is not found for busy outside 
directors with a CEO title in a non-S&P 500 firm. It supports the notion that management 
skills in relatively large, well-known firms could add value to outside directors and 
therefore enhance shareholder wealth. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
With a sample of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004, we examine the differences 
among individual busy outside directors and we find that the generally ambiguous 
 
Table 12 
S&P 500- and Non-S&P 500-CEO Busy Outside Directors  
 
The sample consists of 854 acquisitions from 1998 to 2004. In regression (1), and (2) the dependent 
variable is the acquirer’s equal-weighted five-day (-2, 2) cumulative abnormal return in percentage points 
calculated using the market model. Value-weighted five-day (-2, 2) cumulative abnormal return in 
percentage points is applied in regression (3) and (4). Outside directors are defined as busy if they hold 
three or more directorships. SP500-CEO (Non-SP500-CEO) busy outside directors are busy outside 
directors with a CEO title in a S&P 500 (non-S&P 500) firm. Board size measures the number of directors. 
Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up is acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal return during the 
period (-210, -11) with the CRSP value-weighted market index as the benchmark. Free cash flow is 
calculated as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, income taxes, and capital 
expenditures scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is the book value of long-term debts and short-
term debts over market value of total assets. Tobin’s q is calculated as market value of common equity plus 
preferred stock liquidating value, plus long term debt, minus short-term assets, plus short-term liabilities, 
and then scaled by total assets. Relative deal size is deal value over acquirer’s market capitalization.  
Market capitalization, measured in millions, is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by 
the stock price at the year end prior to announcement date. Diversifying acquisitions are acquisitions in 
which acquirers and targets do not share a 2-digit SIC code. Intrastate is a dummy indicator and is 1 if 
acquirer and target are in the same state. The t-statistics is reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** stand for 
statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 12 – Continue 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of busy outside directors -3.727** -5.398*** -3.907** -5.450*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.90) (-2.32) (-2.81) 
Percentage of SP500-CEO busy outside directors  8.203**  7.567** 
  (2.39)  (2.17) 
Percentage of non-SP500-CEO busy outside directors 0.147 1.882 1.226 2.827 
 (0.03) (0.35) (0.23) (0.51) 
Percentage of outside directors 4.690* 4.222* 3.817 3.386 
 (1.89) (1.70) (1.48) (1.31) 
Log (board size) 0.600 0.506 0.522 0.435 
 (0.41) (0.35) (0.36) (0.30) 
Log (inside ownership) 0.523 0.563 0.553 0.590 
 (1.41) (1.53) (1.45) (1.56) 
CEO chairman -0.663 -0.662 -0.704 -0.703 
 (-0.88) (-0.89) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up -3.394*** -3.422*** -4.017*** -4.042*** 
 (-3.63) (-3.64) (-3.97) (-3.98) 
Free cash flow -5.494 -5.743 -5.354 -5.584 
 (-0.44) (-0.46) (-0.42) (-0.43) 
Leverage 3.246 3.759 2.637 3.110 
 (0.88) (1.00) (0.69) (0.80) 
Log (total asset) 0.285 0.241 0.400 0.359 
 (1.13) (0.96) (1.57) (1.42) 
Log (firm age) -0.185 -0.235 -0.402 -0.448 
 (-0.36) (-0.46) (-0.77) (-0.87) 
Tobin’s q 0.414** 0.402** 0.434** 0.422** 
 (2.29) (2.21) (2.26) (2.19) 
Intrastate 0.930 0.892 0.928 0.893 
 (0.85) (0.82) (0.84) (0.81) 
Relative deal size -3.416*** -3.374*** -3.730*** -3.691*** 
 (-3.08) (-3.05) (-3.23) (-3.20) 
All-cash deal 1.850*** 1.775*** 1.822*** 1.754*** 
 (2.70) (2.61) (2.71) (2.63) 
Diversifying acquisitions -0.784 -0.734 -0.620 -0.573 
 (-1.14) (-1.07) (-0.90) (-0.83) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 
 
relationships between busy outside directors and firm value could be driven by different 
types of busy outside directors. Supporting this latter argument, we find that busy outside 
directors are associated with lower acquirer returns during acquisitions.  However, busy 
outside directors with a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm and busy outside directors with all 
outside directorships in other industries do not reduce shareholder value during 
acquisitions. While our results do not indicate that these busy outside directors are better 
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than non-busy outside directors, we do provide empirical evidence suggesting that simply 
using the number of directorships to evaluate outside directors could be inappropriate.  
Busy directors with multiple directorships in different industries and directors 
with a CEO title in an S&P 500 firm can be valuable sources of knowledge and 
experience to firms. Therefore, despite their busyness, these directors may still be good 
candidates for corporate boards. Fich (2005) suggests that some outside directors could 
be better than the others. Our results indicate that busy outside directors with diverse 
outside directorships and management skills in large, well-known firms are different from 
other busy directors and may be valuable to acquiring firms.                         
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